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ABSTRACT

This study examines eighteenth-century British warfare and the commonly held
perceptions of its inapplicability to the North American wilderness. Ever since
independence over two hundred years ago, many Americans have held the opinion that the
fledgling United Colonies won their independence through the superior military skills of
the Continentals and the inability o f the British Redcoats and their officers to adapt to a
new form of warfare in America. Their low opinion of the British developed during the
Seven Years’ War, particularly when General Edward Braddock and his army suffered a
crushing defeat at the hands of several hundred Indian warriors in the forests o f western
Pennsylvania.
Contrary to these allegations, England’s army was well versed in irregular warfare.
An examination o f the centuries o f direct experience in partisan warfare in Ireland,
Scotland, the European continent, and vicariously through England’s colonists in North
America, reveals a long-standing involvement with la petite guerre and a thorough
understanding by British officers o f its nature and dangers. Though oftentimes disdainful
o f this “ungentlemanly” way of war, British officers like Braddock did not ignore
alternative warfare nor did they disregard the warnings of their colonial brethren. In fact,
Braddock conducted his campaign in accordance with doctrine developed from centuries
o f British experience (frequently as the victim). Elis defeat was the result o f simple error,
not the result of any inherent flaw in British military doctrine.
Regardless of the reasons behind Braddock’s defeat, the battle unsettled both the
colonies and the British military establishment. Responding to necessity, the British army
adapted its well-founded tactics to the American wilderness and emerged victorious in
1759. However, the colonists were shocked by the overwhelming defeat of the heretofore
“invincible” Redcoats. Losing confidence in their European overlords, many colonists
began to believe that they would be better off without the bumbling British, and from
Braddock’s rout in 1755 emerged early rumblings for independence.
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WARFARE IN COLONIAL AMERICA:
PRELUDE AND PROMISE

INTRODUCTION

The weather was warm and pleasant on the morning of May 10, 1755. On a
wilderness road in the backcountry of Maryland, a detachment of sailors from His Britannic
Majesty’s navy, under the command o f Lieutenant Charles Spendlow, R.N., marched along
the bank o f the Potomac River toward Fort Cumberland, the rendezvous point for the
expedition against Fort Duquesne. Undoubtedly some o f the sailors wistfully gazed at the
water and wondered why they were so far from the familiar landscape o f a man-of-war
patrolling the ocean. Instead of manning a ship, the sailors were manhandling 3,200-pound
cannon through the North American wilderness.1
Around noon, the clattering of hooves startled the sailors, who turned and saw a
spectacle more fitting for the tidewater of Virginia than the frontier. A company of
Virginia Light Horsemen, festooned in deep-blue uniforms faced with red, galloped down
the road in two columns. In their midst rolled a light carriage carrying a thick-set British
officer, resplendent in his scarlet uniform, white, lace cuffs, and tall, black boots. A shiny
gorget hung below an unremarkable face. A powdered wig, tied at the nape of his neck by
a brown ribbon, crowned his head, and a black tricorne hat perched on top. Nearby, the
redcoated drummers of the Forty-eighth Regiment of Foot rattled out the Grenadier’s
March in salute as the carriage whisked by. A short while later, the slow booming of

1 Winthrop Sargent, ed., “The Morris Journal,” The History o f an Expedition against Fort Du Quesne, in
1755; Under Major-General Edward Braddock, Pennsylvania Historical Society, Memoirs, 5
(Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott and Co., 1856), 373.
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seventeen cannon broke the air, announcing the arrival of Major General Edward Braddock
at Fort Cumberland.2
Braddock’s entry into Fort Cumberland signaled the beginning o f Britain’s 1755
campaign to regain sovereignty over the Ohio Valley, destroy the French fort at the
confluence of the Monongahela and Allegheny Rivers, and avenge the pride lost at Fort
Necessity the previous year. The sad conclusion of Braddock’s segment o f this campaign
resulted in one of the most famous battles in American history and one o f the most
infamous defeats in the annals o f the British army. As the first large-scale battle in North
America pitting British regulars against irregular forces, the Battle o f the Monongahela
seemingly demonstrated the inflexible nature of conventional European tactics and the
unsuitability of British regulars to the wilds o f North America. To many colonials,
Braddock’s insistence on formality, pomp and ceremony, and textbook maneuvers, coupled
with disdain for all things colonial, including wilderness warfare, caused his calamitous
defeat.
For over two hundred years, American nationalism has fostered this belief, latching
on to “obvious” British error as further proof of America’s righteousness and justification
for the rebellion. But closer examination of previous British military experiences and
Braddock’s campaign reveal that the British military was well-versed in the ways of
“alternative” warfare. Braddock conducted his campaign in accordance with solid
doctrine, developed and tested during two centuries of conflict against French partisans
and the Celtic warriors o f Ireland and Scotland. Though circumstances and conditions in
----------------------------------------------

j

2 Ibid., 194-95, 373; Charles Hamilton, ed., “Journal of a British Officer,” Braddock’s Defeat (Norman,
OK: Univ. of Oklahoma Press, 1959), 42, hereafter cited as “JBO;” Franklin Thayer Nichols, “The
Organization of Braddock’s Army,” William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd ser., 4 (1947): 124-47.
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America, such as the harsh terrain and the “new” Indian foe, would force a degree o f
adaptation and adjustment, British tactics were suited to the guerrilla warfare found in the
American wilderness. Simple mistakes and the skill of Braddock’s Franco-Indian foes led
to defeat, not any flaws inherent in the British military. Despite this reality, public
perception o f Braddock’s defeat had far-reaching consequences. Beyond the flurry of
accusations bandied about by politicians and army officers and the explosion o f violence
along the American frontier, American colonists began to doubt the invincibility o f their
imperial parent. With their potentate’s vaunted regulars unable to defend themselves from
“savages” and “papists,” many provincials ventured to believe that the colonies might be
better off without imperial shackles. From this defeat in the summer of 1755 would
emerge rumblings o f independence and a developing sense o f being Americans instead o f
Englishmen.

I

THE IRREGULAR EDUCATION OF JOHN BULL: THE BRITISH ARMY
AND LA PETITE GUERRE, 1558-1755

On the morning o f May 11, 1745, a French army under Maurice, comte de Saxe,
awaited the approaching allied army in southern Flanders. Saxe’s 53,000 men stretched in
a two-mile-long line between the villages of Anthoin and Fontenoy. Down a gradual slope
and across a half-mile o f open ground stood the scarlet and blue battle line o f the allied
army under William Augustus, duke of Cumberland, son o f George II o f England. As the
French artillery fired round after round into the allied line, the British, Dutch, and Austrian
soldiers stood immobile, shifting left and right only to fill the gaps left by careening cannon
balls. On order, 15,000 men stepped forward in unison and maintained a slow, measured
step to the beat o f the drums. Stiff and silent, the allied soldiers continued to march in
perfect order, halting only when within pistol shot of the French. The French battle line
erupted in a single volley and disappeared in the smoke, yet’ few allied soldiers fell. On the
command of officers and sergeants, the British soldiers leveled their muskets in one fluid
motion and began pouring volley after volley into the packed French ranks, which writhed
and finally broke. The allied soldiers pursued the French and repulsed three desperate
charges by the French cavalry. Only after significant losses and the threat of envelopment
did Cumberland’s troops retreat. In the same precise manner, the allied soldiers retraced
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their steps down the slope, leaving the field strewn with thousands o f their dead and dying
comrades.3
Conventional battles with long lines o f soldiers trading volleys at close range, such
as the battle o f Fontenoy, dominated European warfare in the eighteenth century (fig. 1).
The goal o f conventional armies was to secure geographic locations, such as cities,
fortresses, crossroads, or mountain passes to gain advantage over their opponents, not
necessarily to destroy the enemy army. Armed with highly inaccurate muskets, soldiers
had relatively little chance o f hitting an enemy soldier, and thus massed formations and
firepower were necessary to guarantee any damage to the enemy. Such large formations
were unwieldy, requiring both constant drilling of soldiers and a great deal o f open space to
conduct maneuvers. Therefore, most battles occurred on large tracts o f open land where
troop formations and wheeled artillery could move with relative ease.4
While such tactics would continue to dominate the battlefield until the twentieth
century, a different form o f warfare, known as la petite guerre or irregular warfare, grew in
importance in the eighteenth century.5 As in the meaning o f “irregular” (not according to
rule), irregulars avoided the large formations and open battles o f traditional armies. Rather
than long lines of troops in open fields, slow evolutions, and massed fires, irregular soldiers
formed small, independent groups capable of speed and mobility. They used raids and
ambushes to achieve their goals, “to damage the enemy force at the least possible cost to

3 J. W. Fortescue, The History o f the British Army, 2nd ed., 12 vols. (London: Macmillan, 1910), 1:110-21;
James Wolfe to Edward Wolfe, Ghent, May 4 1745, (O.S.), Beckles Willson, The Life and Letters o f James
Wolfe (William Heinemann, 1909), 49-51.
4 Peter E. Russell, “Redcoats in the Wilderness: British Officers and Irregular Warfare in Europe and
America, 1740 to 1760,” William and Mary Quarterly, 3rdser., 35 (1978): 629.
5 Although “guerrilla” and “irregular” were not associated with warfare until the 19th century, for the
purpose of this paper, these words and “partisan” are used interchangeably.
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themselves” or to deny the enemy needed supplies. Because their foes often outnumbered
them, irregulars chose their battles, striking when advantageous and fleeing when not.6
American Indians used irregular tactics of their own similar to this European model.
Ambush was their preferred method o f fighting and was a direct extension o f their hunting
practices. However, before and for a short period after European colonization, Indians
periodically engaged in open field battles (fig. 2). Captain John Underhill o f Massachusetts
Bay recorded his impressions of this formal Indian warfare, similar to European set-piece
battles, and relegated the Indian version to mere recreation. “They come not near one
another, but shot remote, and not point-blank, as we often do with our bullets, but at
rovers, and then they gaze up in the sky to see where the arrow falls, and not until it is
fallen do they shoot again. This fight is more for pastime, than to conquer and subdue
enemies.” The leisurely path o f the arrows, fired in a high arch, allowed the Indians to
dodge most of the arrows, resulting in relatively few casualties. Underhill scoffed at such
battles, claiming “they might fight seven years and not kill seven men.” The introduction of
deadly European firearms to North America eliminated this almost ceremonial form of
battle. The Indians were quick to realize the deadly potential o f firearms, especially when
aimed at individual targets instead o f pointed in the general direction o f the enemy as in the
European fashion. Other characteristics o f firearms made them far superior to the bow and
arrow. “Bullets flew much faster than arrows and took a more direct route to the target.
The heavy lead projectiles were less susceptible to deflection . . . almost impossible to
dodge, and more damaging on impact.” Unlike Europeans, who to the Indians seemed to

6 Russell, “Redcoats in the Wilderness,” 629-30.
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revel in slaughter or were too stupid to realize the destructive power o f their weapons,
Indians abandoned open-field battles and reverted almost exclusively to irregular tactics7
When British regulars arrived in the colonies in great numbers during the 1750s,
they encountered a new enemy, who by then was highly skilled in irregular warfare and the
use o f firearms. After General Edward Braddock suffered his catastrophic defeat in 1755
at the hands o f a largely Indian force using irregular tactics, the British military was
universally perceived as a pack of empty-headed fools, ignorant of irregular warfare and
tactics. Such generalizations were false. Although Braddock was defeated by a band of
“partisans,” ignorance o f guerrilla warfare was not the cause. From the Irish wars o f the
sixteenth century to Charles Stuart’s failed bid for the English throne in 1745, the British
army constantly experienced irregular warfare. Whether as victims or employers o f guerilla
warfare in Ireland, the American colonies, Scotland, or the European wars o f the 1740s, or
reading o f it in popular and professional publications, the British army was thoroughly
familiar with irregular warfare long before Braddock arrived in Virginia in 1755. Although
the conditions and foes differed in America, the practical experiences in battle and the
printed theories of scholars provided British officers and soldiers a solid foundation of
knowledge applicable to war in the North American wilderness.
England began its long association with irregular warfare in 1170. After receiving
Ireland from Pope Adrian II in the Bull ’Laudabiliter,' Henry II invaded the island to bring
his “gift” under control. Six Henrys and three hundred fifty years later, Henry VIII

7 John Underhill, “Newes from America,” Massachusetts Historical Collections, vol. 6, 3rd ser. (Boston:
1837), 26; James Axtell, “The Scholastic Philosophy of the Wilderness,” in The European and the Indian:
Essays in the Ethnohistory o f Colonial North America (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1981), 138-39; Patrick
M. Malone, The Skulking Way o f War: Technology and Tactics Among the New England Indians
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1991), 27-52.
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redoubled English efforts to control the wayward island, both to expand his empire and to
spread the Protestant reformation. Although both he and Henry II had sent Anglo
administrators backed by military might to govern Ireland, neither king truly extended his
power beyond the Pale, a relatively small area around Dublin that was truly anglicized.8
Henry VIII took an active interest in Ireland after 1519 and sought to “devise howe
Ireland may be reduced and restored to good order and obedience.” Henry’s policies
included reviving the loyalties o f the great Anglo-Irish lords (through a system o f surrender
and re-granting o f lands), recalling outlying areas to obedience, establishing an island-wide
tax collection system, extending his religious reforms, and introducing more English-born
nobles to the government and administration rather than relying on Anglo-Irish lords.
Henry extended his Act o f Supremacy to Ireland, but it had little effect except to link the
advance o f Protestantism with the growth o f English plantations and the ongoing conquest.
It was a “fatal alignment of religion and political attitudes.” Henry was too busy with
continental disputes and intrigues to harshly administer his policies, and he had little money
and time to spend on a war of conquest.9
Henry’s daughter Elizabeth used different methods to suborn Ireland. Previous
Anglo administrators and nobles often adopted Irish customs and were gradually
“hibernicized,” and became “degenerate English.” To truly anglicize the island, Elizabeth
sought to overwhelm Irish customs by encouraging English families to settle in Ireland and
provide the Irish with a “civilized” example to emulate. Furthermore, rather than tolerate
their “wild Shamrock manners,” Elizabeth sought to stamp out the traits of the culturally

8 Grenfell Morton, Elizabethan Ireland (London: Longman, 1971), 3-19; James Axtell, “Beyond the Pale:
England’s Apprenticeship in Ireland” (lecture presented at the College of William and Mary,
Williamsburg, Va., 23 February 1999).
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“inferior” Irish. Elizabeth and her counselors felt the conquest and subjugation o f the Irish
justified. “The government o f these princes was neither politique nor civil, but meer
tyranical,” wrote an English government official, “for the princes or Lord use at their
pleasure their tenants, spend upon them with their trains, rule after their own lust,
commanding all, and not to be gainsaid by any.” More than the supposed tyranny o f Irish
lords, the English despised Irish culture, and in order to “transform Ireland from a menage
o f petty independent lordships into an exploitable appendage,” they would have to destroy
the Irish cattle-based economy and replace it with Anglo agricultural methods. However,
the poor Irish soil encouraged transhumance, or “booleying,” frequent movements of
herds, herdsmen, and escorts (collectively known as creaghts). Based on this, the English
declared the Irish to be nomads (“[They] run roving about the country like wild men.”) and
thus fit only for subjugation and reduction to civility. Faced with the institutional
destruction of their culture, the Irish resisted, and a war o f incredible ferocity and
destruction ensued that raged on and off for the rest o f Elizabeth’s reign.10
While the Irish passionately resisted, the English had overwhelming military
superiority, both in equipment and training. Lacking a formal army other than the personal
warbands o f each chieftain, the Irish resorted to the method suited to their culture: guerrilla
warfare. Because the Irish were mobile by nature and inclined toward hit-and-run tactics
used in cattle raids and inter-clan feuds, guerrilla warfare was a natural extension o f their
daily existence.11

9 Ibid.
10 Ibid.; Morton, Elizabethan Ireland, 3-11; James Michael Hill, Celtic Warfare, 1595-1763 (Edinburgh:
John Donald Publishers, Ltd., 1986), 17-18; Steven G. Ellis, Tudor Ireland: Crown, Community and the
Conflict o f Cultures, 1470-1603 (London: Longman, 1985), 40-44.
11 Axtell, “Beyond the Pale.”
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Besides inherent ability, English superiority in weaponry forced the Irish to adopt
irregular warfare. Gaelic weaponry and tactics had not kept pace with changes in
European weaponry that occurred in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. Lacking siege
equipment, stirrups for horses (a centuries-old improvement), and modem firearms, the
Irish could not compete in a formal, open-field battle. On smaller horses and without
stirrups, the Irish cavalrymen were not fitted for shock action and were thrust off their
saddles if they attempted to joust with their English opponents. Sir John Norris held the
Irish cavalry in such contempt that he declared them fit only to catch cows. The typical
Irish foot soldier, a kernagh, or kerne, was also lightly armed and possessed no armor save
for his “glibb,” a thick lock of hair combed over his forehead that might blunt the force o f a
blow (fig. 3). His was “no different in his apparel when fighting or herding cattle.” A
contemporary English foe described a typical kerne as “ a foot man, slightly armed with a
skayne [a type o f dagger], a target o f wood, a bow and shefe or else 3 darts which they
cast with wonderful facility and nearness, a weapon more noisome . . . than it is deadly.”
Their bows were half the length o f the English longbow and hence had roughly half the
penetrating power. Lightly armed and armored and possessing inferior weapons, the keme
were vulnerable in pitched battles against English armies, whose soldiers carried
arquebuses or heavy fifteen-foot pikes and wore burgonets, corselets, pouldrons,
vambraces, tasses, and gauntlets.12
Despite such disadvantages, the Irish were wonderfully suited to guerrilla warfare.
Lacking the heavy armor that weighed down English soldiers, Irish keme moved swiftly
12 Ellis, Tudor Ireland, 118; Hill, Celtic Warfare, 24; Cyril Falls, Elizabeth’s Irish Wars (London:
Methuen and Co, Ltd., 1950), 40, 69-70; Axtell, “Beyond the Pale;” C. G. Cruickshank, Elizabeth 'sArmy,
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and skillfully through rough and marshy terrain. Where Englishmen feared drowning, “the
Irish keme hopped like a goat from one tussock to another.” With such mobility, the Irish
often chose their battlefield and fought on their own terms, attacking the English “in
passes, bogs, woods, forests, and in all places o f advantage.” According to a captain
writing to Robert Cecil, Elizabeth’s secretary of state, if a battle turned against the Irish,
“they held it no dishonor to mn away; for the best sconce and castle for security is their
feet.” The overburdened English soldiers, suited to open plains and valleys, could not keep
up with the Irish, who sheltered in the “heavily wooded, marshy or mountainous country
which typified Gaelic Ireland.” Large English armies that managed to penetrate such rough
terrain seldom found anyone to fight, and smaller detachments suffered continuous
ambushes and frequent defeat.13
Using irregular tactics, the Irish enjoyed some successes against English armies. In
1595, Hugh O’Neill and his Irish army, mostly irregulars, nearly destroyed Sir Henry
Bagenal’s English army at Clontibret. Using marksmen hidden in “woods and thickets,
deep and dangerous bogs, steep and craggy hills and mountains,” O’Neill lured the English
into a trap, sniping at the English soldiers but never allowing a frill battle to develop. As
their wounded increased, the English column slowed and finally ground to a halt at
nightfall. Short of powder and ball, the English army survived only because o f O’Neill’s
aversion to night attacks. An English relief column escorted Bagenal’s shaken army to
shelter the next morning, carrying at least 31 dead and 109 wounded. Other Irish
successes mirrored O’Neill’s victory at Clontibret, and in fact, with the exception o f

2nd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1966), 117-18. Steel armor for the head, torso, shoulders, arms, thighs,
and hands respectively.
13 Falls, Elizabeth’s Irish Wars, 46; Hill, Celtic Warfare, 24, 39; Ellis, Tudor Ireland, 118.
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Yellow Ford in 1598 where the unlucky Bagenal met his death, not one Irish victory “was
gained in any other circumstances.”14
Such tactics infuriated English officers, leading Thomas Burgh, briefly viceroy o f
Ireland, to complain o f “barbaric” tactics employed by the rebel leader O ’Neill. “For, as he
is the dishonestest rebel of the world, so is he the most cowardly, he never making good
any fight, but bogring with his shot and flying from bush to bush.” At night “he lodgeth
dispersed in the thicks and holds no firm guards, but throws himself and all his into sundry
groves, lurking scattered like wolves or foxes, fitter to hunt with dogs than to find with
men.” 15
Seemingly hapless in the rough terrain preferred by the Irish irregulars, the English
armies had great difficulty bringing their foes to battle. However, English officers were not
bungling fools, and despite their distaste for Irish ways, several officers sought to adapt
English methods and adopt Irish means in order to defeat their wily enemy. Recognizing
the advantage o f light, mobile troops, English commanders adapted their weapons and
armor to the terrain. Some discarded the heavy and ponderous arquebuses for pistols;
shorter spears replaced fifteen-foot pikes, difficult to wield in forests; and heavy armor
gave way to leather, mail, or simply no armor at all to allow soldiers to cross marshy
ground (fig. 4).
Despite these changes, the English army continued to suffer serious setbacks. In
1599, the queen’s favorite, Robert Devereaux, second earl o f Essex, was appointed Lord
Lieutenant of Ireland and given 16,000 infantrymen and 1,300 cavalrymen to subdue
O’Neill. Four months after his arrival and after suffering defeats at Maryborough and
14 Hill, Celtic Warfare, 25; Falls, Elizabeth’s Irish Wars, 188.
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Glenmalure, Essex’s force was reduced to only 4,000 effectives. He was soon replaced by
Charles Blount, eighth Lord Mountjoy. Mountjoy took several steps to reorganize the
English army in Ireland after becoming viceroy o f Ireland in 1600. Instead o f relying on
heavy English horses, Mountjoy switched to hobelars—small, light horses similar to those
used in the marches o f Scotland—which could traverse rough terrain or bogs with relative
ease. Mountjoy also systematically recruited and employed contingents o f Gaelic troops
from Ireland, Scotland, and Wales. These men, used to the Gaelic ways o f war, could
follow, find, and fight the Irish rebels on their terms. Such border troops became so
indispensable that one o f Mountjoy’s subordinates claimed that “without them no notable
exploits can be done.”16
Mountjoy also made strategic changes. Instead of penetrating enemy territory and
leaving an isolated garrison to “pacify” the region, Mountjoy created mutually supporting
outposts along O ’Neill’s border to hem him in. The English lord also waged total war on
the Irish rebels and sought to destroy their food supplies with a series o f raids, often
waterborne, that devastated the countryside, destroying crops, herds, and people. His
lieutenant, Sir Arthur Chichester, reported the results o f one such raid. “We have burnt
and destroyed along the Lough [Neagh], even within four miles of Dungannon, from
whence we returned hither yesterday; in which journeys we have killed above one hundred
people o f all sorts, besides such as were burnt, how many I know not. We spare none o f
what quality or sex soever, and it hath bred much terror in the people who heard not a
drum nor saw not a fire there o f a long time.” These raids also disrupted traditional

15 Ibid., 75.
16 Axtell, “Beyond the Pale;” Ellis, Tudor Ireland, 118, 124-25, 127; Hill, Celtic Warfare, 30-31; Falls,
Elizabeth's Irish Wars, 253-58; Morton, Elizabethan Ireland, 86-87.
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planting periods. “Being thus troubled in the Seede time, [they] could not sowe their
ground.”17
Lord Mountjoy also studied his foe and turned their strengths into weaknesses.
Recognizing the Irish dependence on terrain for shelter and sustenance, he chose to attack
in winter, and by immobilizing the creaghts, reduced the Irish army’s mobility and ability to
feed itself. “In Ireland the winter yieldeth best services, for there the trees are bare and
naked, which use both to clothe and house the Keme, the ground is cold and wet which
useth to be his bedding, the air is sharp and bitter which useth to blow through his naked
sides and legs, the Kine are barren and without milk, which useth to be his only food.”
Lacking the natural cover o f the leafless woods, exposed to the elements, and short o f
food, the Irish were vulnerable to attack and defeat. Though Mountjoy did not experience
success immediately, his changes and adaptations (and foolish moves by the rebel O’Neill
at the battle o f Kinsale in December 1601) allowed the English to effectively counter the
Irish irregulars and eventually defeat them.18
England’s irregular education continued in the American colonies during the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, although regulars were largely absent before 1755.
Many colonists immediately drew parallels between the Indians and the Irish based on
perceived similarities in “barbaric” lifestyle and methods o f warfare. In 1646, the Puritan
minister Hugh Peter, an eye-witness to the Pequot War in 1637 and the Irish campaigns of
the 1640s, recommended fighting the Indians in the same way as the Irish. “The wild Irish
and the Indians doe not much differ and therefore would be handled alike.” Early Indian
17 Hill, Celtic Warfare, 30-31; Cruickshank, Elizabeth's Army, 206; Morton, Elizabethan Ireland, 90-91,
134-35.
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conflicts, such as the Pequot War, demanded little change in European methods o f war
because o f quick victory. But the Indians’ frequent and decisive victories in King Philip’s
War in 1675-76 forced colonists to adapt.19
When hostilities broke out between Philip’s allies and the New England colonies in
the summer o f 1675, the colonists expected and sought to fight the Indians in
conventional, open-field battles. Colonial militia units marched out to fight with flags
flying and drums beating. But the Indians refused to oblige the colonists and instead
“would immediately fly an hundred ways at once into swamps, so as our men could not
follow them, or if they did, could not see two o f them together.” The English derided such
apparent cowardice, complaining that the Indians would “seldom or never” dare “to meet
our Soldiers in the open Field, unless when they have a very great Advantage as to their
numbers, or Covert o f the Woods and Bushes.”20
Using lightening-quick raids, “fast-moving, forest-wise Indian war parties were able
to repeatedly baffle the ponderous English units, retreating successfully when necessary.”
Able to avoid serious entanglements with colonial troops, Philip’s Indians attacked with
impunity, ambushing, raiding, and retreating with little consequence to themselves. Like
the Irish, the Indians retreated to the safety of the swamps, where the English could not
follow without fear o f ambush. These bogs were “so full o f trees that a parcel o f Indians
may be within the length o f a Pike o f a Man, and he cannot discover them; and besides, this
as well as all other swamps, is so soft Ground, that an Englishman can neither go nor stand
18 Axtell, “Beyond the Pale;” Ellis, Tudor Ireland, 118, 124-25, 127; Hill, Celtic Warfare, 31; Falls,
Elizabeth’s Irish Wars, 253-58.
19 Raymond Phineas Steams, The Strenuous Puritan: Hugh Peters, 1598-1660 (Urbana: Univ. of Illinois
Press, 1954), 342.
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thereon.” What made this even more frustrating was the apparent ease with which the
Indians traversed such terrain. “These bloody Savages will run along over it, holding their
Guns cross their arms (and if occasion be) discharge in that position.” Samuel Gorton,
recalling the Irish wars, complained that swamps were “more pernicious to valiant souldiers
then are bullwarks, towers, Castles, and walled cities. I remember the time o f the warres in
Ireland . . . where much English blood was spilt by a people much like unto these . . .
where many valiant souldiers lost their lives, both horse and foot, by means o f woods,
bushes, boggs, and quagmires.” Many colonial leaders believed it fruitless to even attempt
to enter the swamps in pursuit. “It is ill fighting with a wild beast in his own den.”21
Despite the apparent futility o f their own tactics, New Englanders were initially
unwilling to adopt any Indian methods o f war. Viewing the war as a battle to prevent their
own degeneration into “savageness,” many colonists refused to adopt Indian ways, fearing
this would be the first step toward losing their English identity. Opponents o f change
acquired moral ammunition when Indians destroyed Captain Thomas Lathrop’s company
on September 18, 1675. While escorting a supply train from Deerfield to Hatfield,
Lathrop’s eighty men fell into an ambush set by a large force o f Indians. In a wellintentioned attempt to fight the Indians on their own terms, Lathrop ordered his men to
scatter among the trees and fight individually. Targeted one by one by the elusive Indians,
fewer than ten o f Lathrop’s men escaped with their lives. Reverend William Hubbard
20 Axtell, “Scholastic Philosophy,” 138-41; William Hubbard, The History o f the Indian Wars in NewEngland [1677], ed. Samuel G. Drake, 2 vols. (Roxbury, Mass: 1865), 112.
21 Douglas Edward Leach, Flintlock and Tomahawk: New England in King Philip ’s War (Hyannis, Mass:
Parnassus Imprints, 1958), 71; Samuel Gardner Drake, The Old Indian Chronicle; Being a Collection o f
Exceeding Rare Tracts Written and Published in the Time o f King Philip ’s War. . . (Boston: Boston
Antiquarian Institute, 1836), 14; Samuel Gorton to John Winthrop, Jr., 11 September 1675, The Winthrop
Papers, Collections of the Massachusetts Historical Society, 4th Ser., vol. 7 (Boston: Massachusetts

18

lambasted the dead Lathrop for such foolish actions, claiming that if the captain had led his
men forward en mass, he would have lost very few men. “For the Indians, notwithstanding
their Subtleties and Cruelty, durst not look on Englishmen in the Face in the open Field,
nor ever yet were known to kill any Man with their Guns, unless when they could lie in
wait for him in an Ambush, or behind some Shelter, taking Aim undiscovered.”22
Fortunately for New England, Hubbard’s opinion was not universal, and various
government leaders and private citizens made attempts to adapt Indian methods or entirely
new ways o f fighting. Governor John Leverett o f Massachusetts Bay openly advocated
adaptation, urging that the soldiers “bee commanded to attend the Enemies method, which
though it may seeme a rout to ours, is the best way of fighting the Enemy in this brushy
wilderness.” Some ideas, such as armored chariots, were ludicrous and represented the
frustration and desperation felt by the colonists. Others brought in dogs for “finding out
the enemy in their swamps,” to prevent ambush, and to warn settlements o f intruders.23
The introduction o f dogs was not a stroke o f inspiration on the part o f the English
settlers. Dogs had long served as weapons o f war and defense and as forms o f bloody
entertainment. It was traditional in England to train mastiffs to fight, primarily “to baite the
Beare, to baite the Bull and other such like cruell and bloudy beastes.” Aside from the
Irish Wolfhound, the mastiff was the “lord o f the hounds” in Britain, weighing over 150
pounds and towering above other dogs at 30 inches in height. In his book O f Englishe

Historical Society, 1891), 630; Hubbard, History o f the Indian Wars, 72; Axtell, “Scholastic Philosophy,”
141, 145.
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23 Leach, Flintlock and Tomahawk, 93; George Madison Bodge, Soldiers in King Philip’s War: Being a
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Dogges, Johanes Caius described the mammoth breed as “vaste, huge, stubbome, ougly,
and eager, of a hevy and burthenous body . . . and frightfull to beholde . . . capable o f . . .
striking colde feare into the harts of men, but standing in feare o f no man.”24
The Spaniards were the first to let loose the dogs o f war on the American natives,
and the Iberians quickly turned the mastiffs brutal nature and immense physical power to
terrorizing the Indians. Numerous contemporary historians, such as Bartolome de Las
Casas, recorded the conquistadores' successes with hounds, and English translations of
these works appeared in the publications o f the cosmographer Richard Hakluyt and the
historian Samuel Purchase in the early seventeenth century. English sailors, traders, and
settlers applied the tactics pioneered by the Spaniards in their own conquest o f the new
world, and dogs became an effective tool to counter the Indians’ advantages in forest
warfare.25
Though writing twenty-five years after the conclusion of King Philip’s war,
Reverend Solomon Stoddard recognized the usefulness of dogs that Governor Leverett’s
contemporaries must have seen as well. “If dogs were trained up to hunt Indians as they
doe Bears: we should quickly be sensible o f a great advantage thereby . . . [The Indians]
are not much afraid o f us, they know they can take us and leave us . . . But these dogs
would be such a terrour to them.” With sharp-nosed hounds to warn of ambush, the militia
“would follow their dogs with an undaunted spirit, not fearing a surprise.” However,

24 Johannes Caius, OfEnglishe Dogges. . . [1576] (London: A. Bradley, 1880), 23-26; Mark A.
Mastromarino, “Teaching Old Dogs New Tricks: The English Mastiff and the Anglo-American
Experience,” The Historian, 46 (1986): 11-16.
25 Matromarino, “Teaching Old Dogs New Tricks,” 17-20; See also Francis de Ulloa, The First and Second
Discovery o f the Gulf o f California . . . in Richard Hakluyt, The Principal Navigations, Voyages,
Traffiques, and Discoveries o f the English Nation, 12 vols., 2nd ed. (New York: AMS Press, 1965), 9:260;
and Samuel Purchas, Hakluytus Posthumus, or Purchas His Pilgrimes, 20 vols., [1625] (Glasgow: J.
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Stoddard must have felt a tinge o f guilt for subjecting the Indians to such horrible
treatment, and he justified the use o f mastiffs by equating Indians with animals and
accusing them o f acting as “thieves and murderers.” “They act like wolves and are to be
dealt withall as wolves.” And thus they were. On October 16, 1675, after capturing an
Indian woman near Hatfield, Captain Samuel Moseley ordered the woman “to be tom in
peeces by Doggs and she was soe dealt with.”26
While dogs may have frightened the Indians, the New Englanders’ greatest
successes against Philip’s irregulars came from using friendly Indians as scouts, much as
Mountjoy did with Irish, Scots, and Welsh natives. Indian allies minimized the threat and
fear of ambush, inspiring greater confidence among the colonial troops. Indians also taught
the English to move swiftly and quietly through the woods and were quick to correct
mistakes. On one occasion, a Mohegan warrior leading a party o f Connecticut soldiers
made one man take off his squeaking shoes and had another dampen his leather breeches
because they were rustling. One New Englander declared that friendly Indians had saved
the colonies from dire consequences. “Had it not pleased god to draw forth some other
Indeans (such as were) former enemies to our now enemies: to aid the English to finde
their enemies: and overtake them (when the English cannot) we might have bin driven to
great straits.”27
No New Englander was more successful in utilizing such friendly Indians in
conjunction with English troops than Benjamin Church o f Plymouth Colony. Church was

26 Solomon Stoddard to Joseph Dudley, Northampton, 22 October 1703, New-England Historical and
Genealogical Register, 24 (1870): 269-70; Axtell, “Scholastic Philosophy,” 142; Malone, Skulking Way o f
War.
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familiar with the marshy areas o f his colony and neighboring Rhode Island, and, more
important, he knew much about the Indians and saw the benefits o f using their own tactics
against them. Afler receiving a captain’s commission in the Plymouth militia, Church
refused to remain penned up in towns or garrisons, so-called “Nests for Destruction,” and
declared that he and his troops “would lye in the Woods as the Enemy did.” Instead,
Church formed an independent company o f “ 150 of the best Souldiers” and “ 100 o f the
Friend Indians” and sought the enemy “wherever they might lurk” in order “to beat them at
their own tricks o f forest warfare.”28
Church learned from the failures o f previous English expeditions and implemented
several unconventional changes. One such modification involved alternate firing. Typically
the militia fired every weapon in a single volley, leaving the entire unit with unloaded
weapons and vulnerable to attack. Church “called on his Men not to discharge all their
Guns at once” in order to deny the Indians “an opportunity to run upon them with their
Hatches.” Instead, by staggering volleys, a portion o f his company’s weapons remained
loaded and ready to resist assault. Another change restricted the personal habits of his
men. Other English units’ attempts to ambush Indians had failed because o f men “troubled
with the Epidemical plague o f lust after Tobacco.” Therefore, Church prohibited smoking
while on his missions. He was also quite willing to learn from his Indian allies. On one
occasion, Church asked an Indian how Philip’s people always got the better o f the English.
They told him, that the Indians gain’d great advantage o f the English by
two things; the Indians always took care in their Marches and Fights, not to
27 Leach, Flintlock and Tomahawk, 153; Daniel Gookin, An Historical Account o f the Doings and
Sufferings o f the Christian Indians o f New England, in the Years 1675, 1676, 1677 [1677] (New York:
Amo Press, 1972), 441-42.
28 Axtell, “Scholastic Philosophy,” 145-46; Benjamin Church, The History o f King Philip's War [1716]
(Boston: John Kimball Wiggins, 1865), 67-68; Leach, Flintlock and Tomahawk, 217.

22

come too thick together. But the English always kept in a heap together,
that it was as easy to hit them as to hit an House. The other was, that if at
any time they discovered a company o f English Souldiers in the Woods,
they knew that there was all, for the English never scattered; but the
Indians always divided and scattered.

Church implemented this and thereafter spread out his command while marching through
thick terrain. “Mr Church . . . order’d his little Company to March at double distance, to
make as big a show (if they should be discovered) as might be.” Church’s tactics worked,
and frequently when his company encountered the enemy, the hostile Indians fled,
“expecting the great Army.” Utilizing such methods, Church was often triumphant over
/

the Indians, and in the final phase o f the war in summer 1676, Church fought, captured,
and killed scattered bands o f Philip’s Indians, including the Wampanoag sachem, at little
i •
cost to his
own men. 29

Although no English regulars took part in King Philip’s War, the experiences o f
Benjamin Church and other colonists were not unknown to the people in England.
Between 1675 and 1682, London printers published fourteen different accounts o f the war
in the form o f letters, sermons, epic poems, and histories. Some o f these appeared in the

London Gazette only weeks after the war began. All of these accounts were popular with
the reading public o f England and most had at least moderate print runs. London
booksellers aggressively advertised the tracts, listing them in the Term Catalogues, a
brochure o f London booksellers, or printed the stories as supplements to the London

Gazette. Hundreds of unpublished, hand-copied newsletters circulated throughout England
as well. Copies o f the seventeen accounts printed in the colonies also made it across the
ocean to London in the form o f official narrations sent by colonial authorities to King
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Charles or by colonists shipping books to friends and family in England. Church’s account,
published by his son in 1716, circulated widely as well. Although designed to bolster the
captain’s image and secure his place in history, the book recounted Church’s successful
experiences with irregular warfare in such detail that, according to James Axtell, it “might
well have served the New English [or even the English military] . . . as a guide to the
conduct of Indian warfare.” The large number and extensive circulation of accounts
printed in England guaranteed exposure o f the English military to American irregular
warfare in at least a cursory manner.30
King Philip’s War was only the first in a long series of conflicts in the American
colonies involving irregular warfare. Between Philip’s death in 1676 and George
Washington’s ambush o f French forces under Joseph Coulon de Villiers, sieur de
Jumonville, in 1754, England fought three major wars in North America, known to the
English as King William’s War (1689-97), Queen Anne’s War (1702-13), and King
George’s War (1744-48). However, instead of facing only Indian foes, the English
colonists fought French troops from Canada. This international threat to the colonies
insured the attention but not the large-scale participation o f the English government in the
conflicts’ North American theater. With fierce fighting on the European continent and
surrounding oceans, England left the colonies to conduct their own actions.
In each o f these colonial wars, France was far more effective in employing
irregulars and Indians than were the English. During King William’s War, French officers
led numerous Franco-Indian war parties in attacks on English settlements. Louis de
Buade, comte de Frontenac, governor o f New France, planned an ambitious campaign to
29 Church, History of King Philip’s War, 28, 32-33, 121-22; Axtell, “Scholastic Philosophy,” 146-48.
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take Albany and New York in 1690. Diverted by lack o f support, his parties instead raided
Schenectady, New York, killing sixty inhabitants; Salmon Falls, New Hampshire, killing
thirty and capturing fifty-four; and Fort Loyal, destroying a force o f one hundred
militiamen. Frontenac’s forces overran sixteen additional frontier posts.31
English colonists mounted a two-pronged retaliatory strike that same year, with a
seaborne expedition directed against Acadia and an overland strike against Montreal via
Lake Champlain and the Richelieu River. Fitz-John Winthrop, a veteran o f the English
Civil War, led a makeshift army o f New York and Connecticut troops on the overland
route but only made it as far as Wood Creek, south of Lake Champlain, where a shortage
o f provisions and an outbreak o f smallpox forced them to retreat before ever sighting a
Frenchman. Winthrop’s Mohawk allies, advancing toward Montreal, suffered a costly
defeat at the hands o f a strong force o f French regulars.32
Four years after the failed English attempt on Montreal, the French struck again.
Pierre Le Moyne, sieur D ’Iberville, led a series of raids on English outposts in the Hudson
Bay region. Forts Hayes, Rupert, Albany, York, and Nelson all fell to Iberville, followed
by all o f Newfoundland. In the last year o f King William’s War, 1697, incessant FrancoIndian raids devastated the English colonies’ border settlements. Mixed bands penetrated
as far as Andover and Haverhill near Boston and left the towns in shambles.33
Seven years later, in the midst o f Queen Anne’s War, the French and Indians
conducted one of their most notorious raids, striking the outlying settlement o f Deerfield,
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32 Ibid., 77-78.
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Massachusetts. The town’s location on the outer fringes o f English settlement left it prone
to attack. But even more dangerous to the town’s safety was one o f its own residents, the
outspoken Puritan minister John Williams. The French had targeted him for capture in
order to exchange him for a high-ranking French prisoner in English hands. To capture
their prize, Jean-Baptiste Hertel de Rouville and Pierre Boucher led a force o f forty-eight
French soldiers and two hundred Abenakis, Caughnawaga Mohawks, and Hurons nearly
three hundred miles in the midst of winter to attack Deerfield.34
After traveling down frozen Lake Champlain, over the Green Mountains, and down
the Connecticut River Valley, the Indian and French force lay quietly outside o f Deerfield
on the morning o f February 29, 1704. After leaving their packs and equipment in a cache
several miles away, the raiding party quietly crept into town and was inside the main
stockade and beating down doors before the English settlers could raise the alarm. “The
enemy came in like a flood upon us,” reminisced John Williams in his popular captivity
narrative. Several Indians broke into his home, captured or killed his family, and rifled his
possessions as he stood by helplessly. Several families barricaded themselves inside
Sergeant Benoni Stebbins’s cabin and poured such a devastating fire into the raiders’ ranks
that they left the house untouched. “About sun an hour high” the raiders left town with
over one hundred captives, including Williams, and left behind forty-seven dead settlers and
numerous burning buildings. A force o f English militiamen from nearby towns pursued the
attackers and managed to kill several before falling into an ambush. The raiders quickly
34 Samuel Carter, “The Route of the French and Indian Army that Sacked Deerfield, Feb. 29th, 1703-04
[O.S.], on their Return March to Canada with the Captives,” History and Proceedings o f the Pocumtuck
Valley Memorial Association, 2 (1898): 127; John Demos, The Unredeemed Captive: A Family Story from
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departed with their captives and wounded comrades and began the long trek back to
Quebec. In this classic example o f irregular warfare, the French and Indian attackers
traveled an incredible distance over rough terrain, struck their enemy with no warning,
inflicted heavy personal casualties, dealt a devastating psychological blow, and lost fewer
than twenty men o f their own.35
If the English military had learned nothing from John Williams and the Deerfield
raid, from Benjamin Church, or the centuries o f conflict in Ireland, the European wars of
the 1740s provided a virtual “schoolhouse” for instruction in irregular warfare. Maria
Theresa’s struggle to secure the throne o f the Austrian Empire from 1740-48 witnessed a
transformation of European warfare, where irregulars began playing a more significant role
than in previous wars o f that century. When Frederick the Great’s Prussian army invaded
Austrian Silesia in 1740, Maria Theresa desperately called on the nobles o f Hungary and
the Balkans for support. The Hungarian horsemen and “wild and barbaric” Croats who
responded were unlike any other soldiers in Europe.36
The Balkans and Hungary had been a battleground between Christian Europe and
the Muslim Ottomans for centuries. Seeking to expand their empire, the Turks waged a
brutal war against the people of southeastern Europe. A unit frequently used by the Turks
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in these wars, the akinjs, or Tartar light horsemen, was known for its mobility and
unpredictability. These riders fought for plunder and captives instead o f wages.37
In response to the Turks’ mobile strikers, the Balkan nobles formed their own
irregulars, known as grenzers (border guards) o r pandours (mounted policemen). Raised
and maintained on a local basis, the grenzers patrolled the eastern frontier o f Christian
Europe, clearing pockets o f Turks from Balkan territory and frequently raiding Turkish
holdings. As recently as 1737-39, grenzers and pandours had fought alongside Field
Marshal Seckerdorf s Austrian army in an unsuccessful war against the Turks. It was many
o f these men, hardened veterans from years o f border conflict, who rode against Frederick
in 1740.38
While these irregulars could not prevent Frederick’s conquest o f Silesia or force the
French to abandon their invasion of Austria, small units, such as Franz von der Trenck’s
dreaded pandours, constantly harassed and chipped away at the invading armies. Isolated
units, weakly guarded supply trains, and unfortified towns all fell prey to the Austrian
“banditti,” so enraging Frederick that he threatened to execute Trenck and his “barbarians”
if he captured them. This particular threat probably stemmed from Trenck’s raid on
Frederick the Great’s quarters and the capture o f the king’s personal silver service.
Frederick’s French allies suffered just as severely from the stings of partisan units. After
abandoning the siege o f Prague in 1742, the French marched their invading force through
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rough mountainous terrain to join the main army in Germany. The Austrian commander
did not let his enemy retreat gracefully and “ordered . . . 5000 Hussars to harass them
during their whole route.” A French officer on the long march complained o f the incessant
Austrian strikes, claiming that he faced “Hussars in Flank, Front, and Rear all the way.”39
Similar irregular forces bewildered the Spanish invaders o f Sardinia-Piedmont in
northwest Italy in 1742. Faced by overwhelming numbers, the Sardinian king recruited
peasants and highlanders to harass the Spanish advance. Frequent skirmishes and
ambushes, along with severe winter weather, took a serious toll on the Spanish army,
which was “continuously harassed by the Vandours and light Troops, who infested their
Rear.” By 1745, Spain could no longer absorb such punishment and began a withdrawal
from Piedmont. But like the French in Austria, the Spanish army was “so harassed [by
Sardinians] in its Retreat out o f Piedmont, that not above 8000 Men were brought off.” In
their haste to escape their tormenters, the Spanish left “most o f their Cannons, Mortars,
and heavy Baggage” for the Sardinians to confiscate. The British did not ignore their
beleaguered Sardinian allies. The army sent General Handasyde and one thousand “English
Swiss” to fight alongside the peasants and highlanders o f Sardinia.40
The Sardinian, Hungarian, and Balkan irregulars were so effective in their efforts to
deny unhindered movement, provisions, and intelligence to their enemies that the Prussians,
French, and Spanish all found it prudent to counter with irregulars o f their own. Frederick
the Great quickly saw the value o f such forces. Following his victory at Mollwitz in 1741,
39 Ibid., 631-32; Franz von der Trenck, Memoirs o f the Life o f the Illustrious Francis Baron Trench,
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“where he experienced and recognized his lack of such units, he made it his first task to
strengthen his army with light troops . . . His example was followed by the French, the
Hanoverians, and the Saxons, all o f whom founded units o f this branch o f the service.”
Frederick formed units o f jagers, while France organized chasseurs to match the Austrian

grenzers and pandours. Recruiters sought out hunters and gamekeepers to fill the ranks
o f the new irregulars, men skilled in marksmanship and used to the conditions o f forests
and other rough terrain. The Spanish created a regiment o f light horse from Italian
criminals, “smugglers well acquainted with the byways,” and a regiment o f infantry “most
o f them from the Romagna [a mountainous region] to make use o f against the Pandours
and Croats, and the enemy’s other irregular forces.”41
Beyond the token force under General Handasyde and the detailed battle accounts
read in The Scots Magazine and The Gentlemen’s Magazine and Historical Chronicle,
Britain’s participation in the early irregular warfare of Europe was minimal. This changed
when a British army joined Austria’s western army in Flanders in summer 1743. O f the
sixty-two thousand Austrians under Prince Charles of Loraine, irregular horse and foot
numbered over seven thousand. Included among the irregulars was “the famous Col.
Metzel at the head o f a large Body o f irregular Troops.” His pandours, inherited from
Trenck, had “made . . . much Noise in the World” with their successful campaigns against
the French. An English officer described in detail his shocked reaction to his new allies.
[The] irregular Troops . . . Croats, Hussars, Pandours etc . . . are encamped
by themselves . . . and their looks represent a wild and Savage Fierceness.
All Night they lie on the Ground without Tents or Straw; in the Day they
40 Samuel Boyse, An Historical Review o f the Transactions of Europe, from the Commencement o f the War
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Dance and exercise themselves with running and throwing o f Stones o f 20
lb. Weight. . . They openly declare th a t. . . they will give no Quarter wither
to Man or Child . . . Yesterday a Body of about 1000 . . . cut in pieces some
Frenchmen . . . and brought away their Heads.
While appreciating the pandours' effectiveness, British officers were shocked by the
irregulars’ rejection o f conventional laws o f war and by the atrocities they committed,
especially Trenck’s habit o f keeping severed enemy heads as trophies. In their rush to
judgment, the British leaders conveniently forgot their ancestors’ habits o f doing the same
in Ireland. Fear o f divine wrath caused some British officers, such as Lieutenant Colonel
Charles Russell o f the Coldstream Guards, to dread the day that the British army would
employ such troops o f their own. “I should almost believe there would some judgement
befall if we were to employ such in our service, unless the utmost necessity required it.”42
Although British leaders apparently felt that “the utmost necessity” had not arrived
in 1744, they continued to feel the bite of irregulars as the French under Marshal Maurice
de Saxe gained experience and proficiency with their own guerrillas. Saxe’s irregulars
constantly harassed British forces with great success during the Flanders campaign. On
one occasion in 1744, a party of Saxe’s partisans “laid an Ambush to intercept” the routine
relief o f British guards at Lanoi. “They posted their men in a thick Copse on one Side o f
the Road, and behind a Hedge on the other.” The commander of the relief column received
warning o f the ambush and sent an advanced guard o f thirty men, “but [only] a Serjeant
and twelve Men to beat the Hedges on the Flanks.” The British flankers missed the French
force, which “lay undiscovered, till it fired on the advanced Guard.” Although surprised,
the ambush did not shock British leaders. The commander’s precautions, though obviously
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insufficient, indicated a familiarity with guerilla tactics and methods for countering them.
Instead o f accusing the French o f using “uncivil” tactics, “the Colonel was . . . blamed for
not having more Men on the Flank, [and] for being so negligent.”43
After observing and, more frequently, suffering from irregular tactics throughout
the 1740s, the time o f “the utmost necessity” finally arrived for Britain to utilize its own
irregular forces in 1745. Charles Stuart, the Young Pretender to the throne o f Britain,
arrived in Scotland --for the first time in his life—to reclaim the crown stolen from his
grandfather James II in the Glorious Revolution of 1688. With a large number o f the
Highland clans rising to support him, Charles had a ready-made army, and the British army
suddenly faced an extremely ferocious enemy skilled in the art of irregular warfare.
For the Highland Scots, guerilla warfare was a way o f life. Like the Irish, the Scots
frequently made their livelihood by thieving from their neighbor’s cattle herds, and periodic
blood feuds between clans ensured sporadic raids and ambushes. While guerrilla tactics
were their forte, the Highlanders were formidable on the battlefield as well. But instead o f
trading volleys o f musket fire, the kilted Scots preferred the shock and close action o f the
Highland charge. Advancing in ragged lines, the Highlanders would fire a single volley at
short range, throw down their muskets, draw their broadswords, and “dart with fury on the
enemy through the smoke o f their fire.” “Their attack is so terrible,” wrote James
Johnstone, a Jacobite staff officer, “that the best troops in Europe would with difficulty
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an Eyewitness (London: 1744), 47-48.
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sustain the first shock o f it, and if the Swords o f the Highlanders come in contact with
them, their defeat is inevitable.”44
Johnstone’s predictions o f Highland victory came true in the first major battles of
the ‘Forty-Five Rebellion. At Prestonpans and Falkirk, the Highland charge destroyed the
British battle lines in a matter o f minutes. Although Prince Charles’s greatest victories
came on the battlefield, the Scottish rebels depended on irregular tactics throughout the
prince’s failed bid for the throne. Soon after the Young Pretender arrived in Scotland, his
supporters initiated a guerilla war on the English. On August 16, 1745, a small party of
Scots under Macdonald o f Keppock and Cameron of Lockiel ambushed two companies of
Royal Scots marching from Fort William to Fort Augustus in the northwestern Highlands.
Startled by the sudden attack, the regulars broke and ran. “By their sudden and unexpected
attack the troops were struck with such an unaccountable panick as with consent to run o f
without so much as taking time to observe the number o f quality o f their enemy.” The
Highlanders chased the fleeing redcoats for nearly a mile, killing twelve before the
remaining eighty surrendered.45
The following month, while besieging Edinburgh castle, Prince Charles sent small
raiding parties into the surrounding lowlands to attack English supporters, gather badly
needed supplies, and keep the restless Highland clans occupied. “Small Parties . . . went
several Ways into the Country, pilfering and stealing all they could lay Hands on.” Other

44 John Prebble, Culloden (London: Seeker and Warburg, 1961), 37-40; James Johnstone, A Memoir of the
‘Forty-Five, ed. Brian Rawson (London: Folio Society, 1958), 82-83.
45 Robert Fitzroy Bell, ed., Memoirs o f John Murray o f Broughton, sometime Secretary to Prince Charles
Edward 1740-1747 (Edinburgh: Edinburgh Univ. Press, 1898), 166; Fortescue, History o f the British
Army, 1:126.
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groups o f Highlanders traveled great distances from the Jacobite army to surprise and
capture several English outposts.46
These stinging attacks eroded the English army’s confidence, and soldiers began to
expect attacks in the most secure locations. “Conceiving themselves insecure everywhere,
they were obliged to redouble their service in the midst o f winter.” Samuel Boyse, an
English historian, chose to put these protective measures in a better light, claiming that the
Jacobite attacks “only served to put our Troops more upon their Guard to prevent such
surprises in their Quarters for the future.”47
Whether the Jacobite tactics spurred change out o f fear or merely prudence, British
military leaders quickly adapted to Highland methods and countered with their own. Soon
Prince Charles’s men came to respect the British regulars’ ability to move and fight in the
rough Highland terrain. Occasionally the regulars successfully reversed roles and
ambushed the Scots. In March 1746, a detachment o f regulars “surprised a Party o f the
Argylshire Highlanders . . . whoe were all either killed or made Prisoners. Two small
Detachments o f the same Body . . . underwent a like fate.” John Campbell, the earl of
Loudon, numbered among the Scots loyal to the house o f Hanover. When hostilities
erupted in 1745, he was in the midst o f forming a Highland regiment for service in the
British army. Loudon turned this regiment against the Jacobites with great success,
earning him the wary respect o f the rebels. In his memoirs o f the rebellion, the chevalier de

46 Boyse, An Important History of the Late Rebellion in 1745. From Authentic Memoirs; Particularly, the
Journal o f a General Officer (London: 1748), 72; James Ray, The Complete History o f the Rebellion.
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([York]: 1754), 48; Robert Forbes, comp., The Lyon in Mourning, or A Collection o f Speeches, Letters,
Journals Etc. Relative to the Affairs o f Prince Charles Edward Stuart, 3 vols., Scottish Historical Society
Publications, vol. 20-22 (Edinburgh: Edinburgh Univ. Press, 1895), I: 91-92.
47 Johnstone, Memoir o f the Forty-Five, 108-109; Boyse, History o f the Late Rebellion, 72.
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Johnston, one o f Prince Charles’s staff officers, frequently remarked on Loudon’s success.
“Lord Loudoun with his corps frequently harassed and annoyed us and he sent detachments
across the arm o f the sea between himself and us, keeping us continually on the alert.”48
Loudon’s harassment o f the rebels increased in 1746. Following the Jacobites’
disastrous defeat at Culloden in April, battlefield encounters disappeared from the war and
the fighting became exclusively irregular. The rebel army scattered throughout the
Highlands to continue the struggle, protect Prince Charles as he scampered into exile, or
simply to return home. Small bands of Jacobites and regulars continually pecked at one
another, with the regulars usually coming out on top. The duke o f Cumberland, newly
dubbed “Butcher” after his troops slaughtered the fleeing Highlanders at Culloden, actively
pursued the fleeing rebels with irregulars of his own. “The Rebels being now dispersed all
over the Highlands, and skulking in secret Comers, Detachments were sent from the
Duke’s Army, and encamped at different Places for Greater Safety o f the Country, and
Convenience o f apprehending the Rebels.” Loudon and his loyal Highlanders were
especially skilled at this task, ranging “the Country, carrying Fire and Desolation as they
passed, shooting the vagrant Highlanders they met in the mountains, and driving off the
Cattle.” These redcoated Highlanders and many other regulars became very proficient in
mountain warfare, often surprising bands o f Jacobites in their isolated hideaways. “They
are greatly surpris’d,” wrote a British officer, “to find our soldiers climb over their rocks
and mountains full as nimble as they can themselves, and bring cattle from places which
they deem’d inaccessible to us.” The ‘Forty-Five proved to be the practical application of

48 Forbes, Lyon in Mourning, I: 256-57, 357; Boyse, History o f the Late Rebellion, 147; [Francis Douglas],
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the lessons learned by the British army in the continental campaigns of the 1740s. Whether
fending off Highlanders with redcoated regulars or commanding their own guerilla warriors
composed of Scots loyalists, the British army gained valuable experience in countering and
utilizing irregular tactics in the Highlands o f Scotland.49
The bitter experiences in Scotland and on the continent, as well as the
popularization o f irregular warfare, caused a flurry o f writing on the subject, both in
popular literature and technical treatises. Reprints of personal letters and other firsthand
accounts o f the exploits of pandours, Highlanders, and hussars appeared in newspapers and
magazines throughout the British Isles and even as far away as the American colonies. The

Boston Weekly News-Letter and The Boston Evening Post as well as all o f London’s papers
\

frequently printed accounts o f the raids and skirmishes. The Scots Magazine and The

Gentlemen's Magazine carried many detailed descriptions o f the battles as well as reprints
o f officers’ letters and occasionally official dispatches. For those officers relegated to
garrison and staff duties far from the fighting, these popular accounts provided detailed
information on irregular warfare, and according to historian Peter Russell, the personal
correspondence o f officers and the subscription lists o f such magazines reveal that many
army officers were regular readers.50
For officers desiring more serious literature on the subject o f irregular warfare, the
1740s and 1750s saw a resurgence o f technical works on warfare. These treatises were not
limited to discussions on training, drill, and linear tactics; ancillary topics such as “the
49 Forbes, Lyon in Mourning, II: 109; Ray, Complete History o f the Rebellion, 347-48; [Douglas], History
o f the Rebellion, 244; Boyse, History o f the Late Rebellion, 120; Russell, “Redcoats in the Wilderness,”
690.
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service o f partisans, or ranging companies” were the focus o f many works. Franz von der
Trenck published his Memoirs in 1747. Although he was fond o f recounting his exploits o f
the boudoir as much as the battlefield, Trenck produced a valuable and entertaining work
on partisan warfare that circulated widely. La Croix followed in 1752 with his famous

Traite de la Petite Guerre, and Lancelot, comte Turpin de Crisse with Essai sur I f Art de
la Guerre in 1754. Both works focused almost exclusively on partisan warfare and
provided guidance and valuable advice for the curious officer. O f the two, Crisse’s was the
more valuable. As an experienced French hussar officer, Crisse advocated the creation of
professional light troops rather than dependence on the “banditti” who frequently
populated such units. His Essai described many aspects o f irregular warfare, ranging from
operations in rough and mountainous terrain to how to conduct—and avoid—ambushes. In
essence, “the work was a practical handbook for troops involved in petite guerre.”51
British officers showed an intense interest in theoretical and practical advancements
in warfare, and “foreign campaigns, regulations, and treatises were constantly referred to,
and drawn on, by British authors.” Translations o f La Croix, Crisse, and other
contemporary authors, “chiefly from the French and German, were commonplace: the main
Prussian and French regulations appeared in English, as did the works o f most
distinguished foreign soldiers,” including Frederick the Great and Marshal Saxe. The
subscription requests for the books and the changes evident in units during their annual
reviews and exercises indicate that the bulk of this literature circulated widely in the British

50 The Boston Evening-Post, 1 April 1745, 8 April 1745, 6 May 1745, 27 July 1745, 7 October 1745, 21
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military. A 1768 work by Captain Bennett Cuthbertson, though published after the initial
flurry, is representative o f the extent o f circulation o f similar monographs. Of
approximately 2,600 regular army officers in 1768, 939 subscribed to Cuthbertson’s book,
“ranging from the C.-in-C. Granby to the lowest ‘2nd Surgeon’—exclusive o f militia officers
and private subscribers.”52
Officers new to the military—often mere boys—were encouraged to read as much of
this literature as possible. Colonel James Wolfe, later conqueror o f Quebec, offered such
advice in 1756 to Thomas Townshend, whose brother was purchasing an army
commission. Foremost on Wolfe’s list was Comte de Turpin’s work, which was “certainly
worth looking into, as it contains a good deal of plain practice.” He continued with a
lengthy list (more than any boy would read) including “the ‘Memoirs’ o f the Marquis de
Santa Cruz, Fenquieres, and Montecucculi,” commentaries on classical works on warfare,
and accounts of other European military heroes such as Gustavus Adolphus, Charles XII of
Sweden, and “Zisca the Bohemian.” At the close of the letter, Wolfe mentioned La Croix’s
slim but significant work. “There is a little volume, entitled ‘Tratie de la Petite Guerre,’
that your brother should take in his pocket when he goes upon out-duty and detachments.”
Wolfe undoubtedly took the book during his “out-duty” to North American shortly after,
and it is not unreasonable to conclude that many other British officers did the same.

53

Whether these technical works or the centuries of exposure to irregular warfare in
Ireland, North America, and Europe truly prepared British officers and soldiers for North
American warfare has been the subject o f debate among historians. In his 1948 biography
52 Houlding, Fit for Service, 167-70.
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o f George Washington, Douglas Freeman doubted that the British officers were anything
other than narrow-minded martinets, automatons who responded in programmed ways
without deviation. “[Braddock] lacked all originality o f mind and exemplified . . . a system
traditional, methodical and inflexible.” Furthermore, Freeman claimed that Braddock, and
all European officers including Marshal Saxe, were ignorant o f irregular warfare, “a type o f
warfare with which he was unfamiliar,” because European warfare was confined to
traditional methods.

Freeman completely ignored Saxe’s role as a proponent o f irregulars

and flexible leadership, the extensive irregular warfare in eighteenth-century Europe, or the
experience o f one o f Braddock’s regiments. The Forty-Fourth Foot, under Sir Peter
Halket, which after suffering defeat at Prestonpans in 1745 successfully fought the Scottish
rebels throughout the remainder of the war, both on the field and in the Highlands.54
The tendency to label British officers as fools continued with Howard Peckham,
who described the British as “unresourceful, inefficient, and even stupid.” Peckham labeled
Lord Loudon, who so successfully fought the Jacobites and whose tenure in North
America was marked with significant changes and modifications to the army, as
“unimaginative.” At the same time, he praised the “successes” of Governor Shirley of
Massachusetts, “this extraordinary civilian,” who failed in his 1755 expedition against Fort
Niagara, built a weak fort on Lake Ontario next to already decrepit Fort Oswego, and
failed to adequately garrison, supply, or support the isolated outposts. Guy Fregault, the
French-Canadian historian, also contributed to this image, labeling the British officer corps

53 James Wolfe to Thomas Townshend, Devizes, 18 July 1756, Willson, Life and Letters o f Wolfe, 296-97.
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54 Douglas Southall Freeman, George Washington: A Biography, 2 vols. (New York: Charles Scribner’s
Sons, 1948), I: 67-97.
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as an example o f “manifest incompetence.” Douglas Leach agreed as well, but contradicted
his own conclusions. While Leach avoided the loaded descriptors used by other scholars,
he agreed that the British experiences in Europe and Scotland did not prepare them for
America. “The conditions o f warfare in the vast and dense American forest required
special techniques and practices unfamiliar to European troops.” However, immediately
following this declaration, Leech admitted that Braddock “was no fool” and he and other
British officers took proper precautions to counter the threats posed by Indian warriors and
the harsh terrain. Unless previous experience had taught the British officers to act in such
a manner, these actions must constitute either blind luck or the work o f Providence.55
Armstrong Starkey avoided the pitfalls that entrapped Freeman, Peckham, and
Leach by examining the European experiences o f the British army instead of ignoring them
and making broad and often foundationless declarations. Like the others, Starkey argued
that North American warfare was foreign to the British military and European models o f
irregular warfare (peasant insurrections, people in arms, and irregulars as auxiliaries to
regular forces) were inapplicable. The closest example to North America, Starkey
reasoned, was “people in arms.” Similar to a popular uprising against government forces,
the “people in arms” model was fairly substantial, well organized, and planned in detail,
such as the Jacobite rebellions o f 1715 and 1745. But even the guerrilla warfare o f the
Highlands in 1745-46 was in no way similar to North American warfare, claimed Starkey,
and British officers “would have not learned many specific tactical lessons that could be
applied to North America.” While Scots were ferocious irregulars like the Indians, they
55 Howard H. Peckham, The Colonial Wars, 1689-1762 (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1964), 141-53;
Guy Fregault, Canada: The War o f the Conquest, trans. Margaret M. Cameron (Toronto: Oxford Univ.
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relied on the charge and close combat to decide the battle. In contrast, the Indians relied
on marksmanship and normally retreated to avoid the bayonet, claimed Starkey. “Thus,
officers with Scottish experience had little, if any, exposure to anything like the Indian
‘skulking way of war’” and no example o f European irregular conflict “provided an
adequate model for the conditions o f North American forest warfare.” While Starkey was
correct that North American warfare differed from that o f Europe, he admitted that
encounters with alternate forms o f warfare or exposure to them in theory could alleviate
the lack o f first-hand experience. “Theory does not have to be directly applicable; it has
value if it simply opens the mind to new possibilities and new contingencies.” And this is
exactly what the British experiences o f the previous six hundred years did.56
North American warfare was new to the British army. Regulars had never fought
in large numbers in North America before 1755 and few had faced Indians. However, the
principles o f irregular warfare were the same: move swiftly, strike with the advantage, and
retreat when necessary. Whether Balkan pandours, Scottish Highlanders, or Shawnee
Indians, small, mobile groups relied on concealment and surprise to defeat their enemies
with the least cost to themselves. American folklore “has tended to obscure” this fact in
efforts to build the legends of American superiority at the cost of the redcoats’ reputation.
Much o f this image o f the bumbling “bullocks” in the wilderness originated with
Braddock’s defeat in 1755. But “British leaders were not obtuse,” claimed historian Daniel
Beattie. “They recognized the central problem early on; b u t . . . they were not successful
immediately.” It was this lack o f instant victory that has led historians to declare the
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British uneducated in the ways o f la petite guerre. This image o f Braddock (and for that
matter any British officer) as a “fool, unwilling to adapt to American conditions . . . [who]
stupidly forced his men to fight in the European manner . . . is nonsense.” In fact, British
leaders, including the much-maligned Braddock, arrived in America with a comprehensive
education in irregular warfare and acted with “vigor and skill.” During the six hundred
years before the Seven Years’ War, the British army had “ample opportunity to observe,
combat, and occasionally conduct guerrilla tactics.” The enormous volume o f printed
material on the subject, whether John Williams’s captivity narrative, Benjamin Church’s
“manual” for Indian warfare, newspaper and magazine articles, or professional treatises,
conveyed the lessons o f the past and provided supplemental or replacement education for
those officers lacking personal experience. Admittedly, British officers lacked “firsthand
experience o f the American wilderness and its fighting men. [But they] were well aware of
the military problems which they posed.” The performance o f British officers and soldiers
in North America during the Seven Years’ War would prove their competence, and if not
for a momentary lapse in diligence, General Braddock might have been a hero instead o f a
goat.57
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II

DEFEAT ON THE MONONGAHELA

Another time we shall know better how to deal with them.
Edward Braddock
During the eighteenth century, the hazily-defined region known as the Ohio country
lay at the heart of the North American conflict between Great Britain and France. Wedged
between French Canada on the north, the British colonies to the east, and the Mississippi
River to the west, the Ohio country occupied a region considered strategically and
economically valuable to both Britain and France. Both European powers and several
colonies extended conflicting claims over the territory, and the Ohio figured prominently in
government policies o f each. Its vast tracts o f land, natural wealth in furs, and many Indian
inhabitants promised an economic boon to whomever could control it. Beyond material
wealth, the entity that controlled the Ohio’s valuable waterways guaranteed itself enhanced
expansion while containing its opponent.58
France suffered a setback in the colonial competition following the Peace of
Utrecht in 1713. Forced to cede portions of Hudson Bay, Newfoundland, and Acadia to
Britain, and fearful of further encroachment by English settlers, France sought to
strengthen New France’s internal defenses by linking its colonies in Canada and Louisiana
with a string o f forts along the Mississippi and Ohio Rivers (see fig. 5). “It is of the
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greatest importance to check the progress o f the claims and enterprises o f the English . . .
Were they to succeed . . . they would cut the communication o f the two colonies o f Canada
and Louisiana,” wrote Antoine-Louis Rouille, comte de Jouy. This became a reality under
Ange Duquesne de Menneville, Marquis Duquesne, governor general o f New France. By
1753, French forts stretched from Montreal to Niagara Falls, through western
Pennsylvania, from Presqu’ile on Lake Eire, to Fort Le Boeuf, to the Indian village o f
Venango. Their next intended post would guard the Forks o f the Ohio.59
British colonial authorities warily eyed the French expansion, which they considered
a territorial encroachment. The British derived their claim to the region from colonial
charters, European diplomacy, and Indian treaties. Under the provisions o f the Treaty o f
Utrecht in 1713, the British gained nominal ownership o f the Ohio. Specifically, Article
Fifteen o f the treaty stated that “the subjects o f France, inhabitants o f Canada and
elsewhere, should not disturb or molest in any manner whatever the five Indian nations
[Iroquois] which are subject to Great Britain, nor its other American allies.” Because the
Iroquois claimed the Ohio by right of conquest (a tenuous claim at best), the region fell
under British auspices. This was reinforced by treaty in 1744 when the Iroquois ceded the
territory to Britain.60
On these grounds, and for personal profit associated with the Ohio Company,
Governor Robert Dinwiddie o f Virginia dispatched Major George Washington, adjutant
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general o f the Virginia militia, to Fort Le Boeuf in December 1753 to formally demand
French withdrawal. The French commander met the demand with a civil but outright
refusal. Dinwiddie quickly responded, and in January 1754 he ordered a fort built at the
Forks o f the Ohio to prevent further French encroachment.61
Marching to the Forks with reinforcements in May, Washington received word o f
the newly-constructed stockade’s capture by the French, who promptly constructed a
stronger fort and named it Duquesne. Still intent on making a show o f force, Washington
remained in the region. On May 27, his forces ambushed a small party o f Frenchmen.
Fearful o f retribution, the Virginians retreated to a makeshift stockade named Fort
Necessity in the Great Meadow of Pennsylvania. Here, in July 1755, the French easily
defeated Washington and sent his small army back to Virginia.62
Washington’s defeat caused much consternation among the British leadership.
Response to France’s aggression was necessary and justified, they thought, but
diplomatically tricky. Despite obviously hostile intentions by both sides, France and Britain
were technically at peace. In order to maintain that fragile status, the British leaders
cloaked their response under the guise of self-defense. Under the direction o f the duke of
Cumberland, captain general o f the British Army, the British government devised a grand
scheme to reclaim and secure disputed territory in North America, all “in the name of
territorial integrity.”63
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The four targets o f this campaign were geographically remote from one another.
Foremost was the capture o f Fort Duquesne at the Forks o f the Ohio. Next in importance
was the French post Fort Niagara. This bastion, on territory claimed by New York and the
Iroquois League, guarded the water and land connections between Lake Ontario and Lake
Erie, and its capture would sever New France’s western outposts from Montreal. Fort St.
Frederick on Lake Champlain controlled the Champlain Valley route from Albany to
Montreal. In previous wars, France used this as a staging area for attacks into New York
and New England. Finally, the British sought to capture Fort Beausejour in Nova Scotia.
Located on disputed ground connecting the Acadian peninsula to the mainland, this post
served as a base o f support for the disgruntled French-Acadian population, now under
British rule. Because the British claimed each location as their own, they could conceivably
attack yet maintain a “treaty-saving posture.”64
Preparations for this massive campaign began in Britain in late 1754. The duke of
Cumberland took a direct hand in all planning. He first selected Major General Edward
Braddock, a singularly undistinguished man, to serve as commander-in-chief o f British
forces in America and personally lead the advance on Fort Duquesne. The sixty-year-old
Braddock had served in the aristocratic Coldstream Guards for forty-four years, and
despite this lengthy term o f service, had never seen battle. “Before his name had become
im m ortal. . . [he] had not done anything to earn himself a place in the chronicles o f the
times.” His personal secretary, William Shirley, Junior, son o f the Massachusetts governor,
expressed a rather harsh opinion o f Braddock in a letter to Governor Robert Morris of
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Pennsylvania. “We have a G— most judiciously chosen for being disqualified for the
service he is employed in, in almost every respect. He may be brave for ought I know and
he is honest in pecuniary affairs . . . [but] a little more ability and a little less honesty upon
the present occasion might serve our turn better.” In spite o f such comments from a young
gentleman, inexperienced in military affairs, Braddock was a competent administrator and
was well-versed in standard European tactics. His future performance would demonstrate
his qualification, until a momentary, disastrous lapse guaranteed his reputation eternal
damnation.65
The soldiers selected by Cumberland were an entirely different matter. Typical of
post-war demilitarization, Britain’s peacetime army in the 1750s was in a poor state. In
addition to its normal mission o f training for war, the army garrisoned the empire’s
outposts and policed the home islands. Lacking a proper police force, the government
depended on the army to aid in the suppression o f smugglers, overawe rioters, and quell
civil disturbances. These additional duties occupied the vast majority o f the soldiers’ time,
leaving precious little for training. Furthermore, the army dispersed its regiments in small
bodies (company-size or smaller) to cover as much territory as possible. Unit leaders
trained their men in basic skills such as musket drill but could not conduct large-scale
maneuver training. Rare was the occasion when two companies trained together;
regimental training was unheard of. Unfortunately, “numbers . . . were an essential
prerequisite for the satisfactory and realistic performance o f the advanced intricacies of the
firings and maneuvers.” To compound this problem, leaders relaxed discipline, especially
overseas, for fear o f large-scale desertion. In a letter to his father, Lieutenant Colonel

65 Sargent, History o f an Expedition, 112; Lee McCardell, Ill-Starred General: Braddock o f the

James Wolfe, the future hero o f Quebec, decried the poor quality o f peacetime soldiers. “I
have but a very mean opinion o f the Infantry in general. I know their discipline to be bad,
and their valour precarious. They are easily put into disorder, and hard to recover out o f
it.” He further condemned the army’s leadership for its laxity, and he predicted dire
consequences. “I am sorry to say that our method o f training and instructing the troops is
extreamly defective, and tends to no good end. We are lazy in time o f peace . . . It will
cost us very dear some time hence. I hope the day is at a distance, but I am afraid it will
„ »66
come.

From this dilapidated, under-trained army, the duke o f Cumberland chose two o f its
worst regiments to accompany Braddock to America. Neither the Forty-fourth Foot,
under Colonel Sir Peter Halket, nor the Forty-eighth Foot, led by Colonel Thomas Dunbar,
had a good reputation. The Forty-fourth earned its notoriety at the battle o f Prestonpans in
1745, where it withstood Charles Stuart’s Highlanders for all o f five minutes. Both
regiments served on police duty throughout Ireland and were far below their authorized
wartime strength. Cumberland’s unwillingness to finance the campaign was his sole reason
for selecting these regiments. As units on the Irish establishment, the Irish parliament,
rather than its British counterpart, paid for their upkeep. Thus, “the bottom line . . .
directed the front line.”67
Braddock filled out both regiments with drafts from other units in the British Isles
and managed to increase their strength to five hundred men apiece, but not without a price.
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The British army routinely rounded out deploying regiments at the expense o f those
remaining behind, and losing units used this opportunity to rid themselves o f troublemakers
and fools. The drafts sent to the Forty-fourth and Forty-eighth were no exception.
Another four hundred colonials would join the regiments in America. This constant influx
o f strangers, poor soldiers, and raw recruits ruined whatever cohesiveness the regiments
had and transformed them into “jumbled associations o f uneven quality.”68
As his final piece o f meddling in Braddock’s campaign, Cumberland determined the
route to Fort Duquesne. He ordered Braddock to cut a road from Virginia to the Ohio
rather than start from the more populous regions o f Pennsylvania. A widely-circulated but
inaccurate map by Lewis Evans, the famed cartographer, depicted the overland route via
Virginia as shorter than the Pennsylvania alternative. Cumberland presumably considered
this, but the powerful investors o f Virginia’s Ohio Company were the likely force behind
the decision. Formed in 1749, the Ohio Company received a royal grant o f five hundred
thousand acres in the Ohio region. Its investors encouraged settlement in hopes o f reaping
large profits from land sales. A road, cut at military expense and capable o f supporting
heavy wagons, would ease the difficult passage to the area and presumably increase
migration. Governor Dinwiddie, among the original investors, stood to gain considerably if
the duke chose the Virginia plan. Another Ohio Company investor and wealthy London
merchant, John Harbury, advised Cumberland to select Virginia. Harbury, who traded
primarily in Virginia, stood to gain twofold.69
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Braddock and then his regiments finally sailed for Virginia, arriving in early
February and mid-March 1755. The British forces gradually moved up the Potomac River
and congregated at Fort Cumberland, a stockade constructed by colonial forces on a bluff
overlooking the junction o f Will’s Creek and the Potomac.70
Before sailing, Braddock had sent Lieutenant Colonel Sir John St. Clair ahead,
royal instructions in hand, to supervise colonial preparations for the expedition. By royal
decree, the king expected each colony to “raise . . . as large a sum as . . . [could] be
afforded as their contribution to a common Fund, to be employed . . . for the general
Service in North America.” Furthermore, the instructions demanded that the colonies
gather provisions, fodder, wagons, and horses, and recruit soldiers to fill out the Irish
regiments. The general arrived expecting to find all in readiness for departure. Instead, he
found a furious St. Clair and colonies more interested in trading with the French than in
supplying the army. Governor Dinwiddie nearly accused the Middle Colonies o f treason.
“All the Provisions the French have for conducting this unjust Invasion o f the Ohio is, as I
am credibly informed, by a Supply from New York and Philadelphia.” Furthermore,
Dinwiddie believed and reported rumors of the Albany merchants reverting to an old policy
of neutrality with the Indians during war in order to assure uninterrupted trade.71
In addition to unscrupulous merchants, Braddock discovered the frustration o f
colonial politics. Each colony’s assembly continuously squabbled with its royal governor,
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and they viewed Braddock’s expedition as just another imposition by Whitehall.
Pennsylvania’s opposition ran deeper than mere power politics. The Quaker-dominated
assembly refused to finance a war fought by proxy and repeatedly sidestepped Governor
Morris’s requests for men, material, and money. An exasperated Morris wrote to
Braddock seeking his understanding. “You are sensible what a Sett o f People I have to
deal with, who think self-defense a Crime, and Instead of advancing the Public Service do
what they can to obstruct i t . . ..” He wrote the general again, apologizing for the behavior
o f his assembly.
I am . . . almost ashamed to tell You that We have in this Province upward
o f Three Hundred Thousand Inhabitants; that We are blessed with a rich
Solid and temperate Climate, and besides our own Consumption raise
Provisions enough to supply a Army o f one Hundred Thousand Men . . .
We Are burthened with no Taxes and are not only out o f Debt, but have a
Revenue o f Several Thousand a Year . . . And Yet when their all is invaded
they refuse to contribute to the necessary Defense o f their Country . . . .
Exaggerating the wealth o f his province, Morris was not innocent in Pennsylvania’s
political games or failure to provide for Braddock, but the notorious Pennsylvania assembly
would continue to impede military actions in this manner for some time to com e.72
Though lacking the moral objection o f the Pennsylvanians, the legislative bodies of
Virginia, Maryland, and the Carolinas were equally recalcitrant. After continuous prodding
from Governor Dinwiddie, Virginia eventually provided provisions, raised several hundred
troops, and voted 20,000 pounds to support the Virginia soldiers. The others yielded far
less.73
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Despite last-minute material contributions, Braddock lacked the horses and wagons
necessary to move his army’s artillery and supplies. To breach the formidable walls of Fort
Duquesne, Braddock had brought a considerable train o f artillery from Britain, including
four twelve-pounder cannon, six six-pounders, four eight-inch howitzers, and fifteen
cohoms.74 This ordinance, its ammunition, and general supplies for the army required
hundreds o f wagons and thousands o f draft animals to pull them. The lack o f natural
forage beyond Fort Cumberland required the army to bring its own, carried by even more
wagons and animals. Early in the campaign, Governor Dinwiddie had pledged 200 wagons
and 2,500 horses, but as late as June 8, Braddock griped that “the Number o f Horses and
Waggons procur’d in these Colonies do not amount to the tenth part o f what I was
promis’d.”75
St. Clair, still fuming at the Quakers, threatened to march into Pennsylvania and
“kill all kind o f Cattle and carry away the Horses, bum the Houses,” and if delayed any
further, “he would with his Sword drawn pass thro’ the Province and treat the Inhabitants
/

as a Parcel of Traitors.” Fortunately, Benjamin Franklin intervened on behalf o f General
Braddock. Franklin preyed on the fears and memories of Pennsylvania’s German
immigrants, who had suffered at the hands o f warring armies in Europe. By coloring St.
Clair as a Hussar, the infamous cavalrymen renowned throughout Europe for their pillaging
and bmtality, Franklin obtained one hundred fifty wagons and over one thousand horses.76
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Braddock’s final hurdle to overcome was a lack o f Indian auxiliaries. George
Croghan, the Pennsylvanian Indian agent and trader, gathered fifty Mingo warriors and
their families at Fort Cumberland. To secure their loyalty, if only temporarily, Braddock
presented them with strings o f wampum and a generous number o f gifts, ordered his fifers
and drummers to play, and fired several cannon, “which astonished and pleased the Indians
greatly.” To Braddock’s ultimate misfortune, no other Indians joined him, and he would
soon lose most o f what he had.77
Braddock’s critics blamed him for the lack o f Indian support, claiming his rough
demeanor and haughty, dismissive attitude angered the Indians. In fact, the fault lies with
others. In the north, Britain’s traditional Indian allies, the Iroquois, chose neutrality despite
the best efforts o f Sir William Johnson, an adopted Mohawk. French agents had
successfully spread dissent among the Iroquois nations, especially the Seneca in the west.
Furthermore, the Iroquois refused to work alongside southern Indians, among their
traditional enemies, who were rumored to be joining the expedition.78
The southern Indians failed to appear due to intercolonial rivalry and petty feuding
between two governors. Governor Dinwiddie appealed directly to the Cherokees and
Catawbas o f South Carolina, bypassing Governor James Glen. Besides irritation over his

y

violated jurisdiction, Glen saw in Dinwiddie’s missives an attempt to steal trade from his
province. In response, he called a conference with the two nations in early June 1755,
effectively drawing their services away. “I wish he had suspended their going to Him at
this Time,” reflected Dinwiddie. He did not give up, though, and he sent Nathaniel Gist,

77 “Captain Orme’s Journal,” 309-310; “Morris Journal,” 329.
78 Dinwiddie to Lord Halifax, [Williamsburg], 6 June 1755, Dinwiddie Records, 2:54-55; “Captain Orme’s
Journal,” 287n.

53

son o f Washington's guide to Fort Le Boeuf in 1753, to personally appeal for support.
Gist successfully convinced three hundred warriors to accompany him back to Virginia. En
route, he encountered Richard Pearis, a South Carolina trader and bitter enemy o f his
father. Pearis convinced the Indians that a governor’s ambassador would posses a written
commission and many gifts. Because Gist lacked both, the Indians refused to continue
until they could “see some person o f authority, upon whose promises they might rely.”79
Back at Fort Cumberland, Braddock’s attempts to maintain discipline eroded his
last Indian support. The Indian women were becoming “popular” with the soldiers,
especially the officers, “who were scandalously fond o f them.” Many soldiers stole rum
and rations to trade for the women’s favors. To restore order, and in his mind to placate
the Indians, Braddock first barred the women from entering the encampment and then
ordered them home. Forty-two warriors left with their families, promising to rejoin
Braddock on the march. They never did. When Braddock set out for Fort Duquesne, only
eight warriors under the Oneida sachem Scarouady marched with him.80
Despite the lack o f Indians, Braddock led a formidable army out o f Fort
Cumberland on June 7, 1755. The two regiments from Ireland, reinforced by several
hundred colonial recruits, boasted seven hundred regulars each. Three independent
companies of redcoats from New York and South Carolina tramped behind their brethren.
Six hundred provincials, primarily Virginians, marched in eleven line companies, two
79Dinwiddie to Halifax, Dinwiddie Records, 2:55; James Titus, The Old Dominion at War: Society,
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companies o f pioneers and carpenters to clear a road, and a small troop o f light horsemen.
One hundred royal artillerymen from the Nova Scotia garrisons and thirty-five seamen
borrowed from the royal navy came along to serve the artillery during the siege. Wagoners
and drovers, including Daniel Boone and Daniel Morgan, managed the hundreds of wagons
and packhorses. Numerous gentlemen volunteers from the colonies, such as George
Washington acting as Braddock’s aide, accompanied the column, as did the normal pack o f
soldiers’ wives, sutlers, and the occasional prostitute. The long column stretched and
contracted like a colorful snake, a gaudy red and blue stream among the dark hues of
nature engulfing it.81
The army faced a daunting journey. Instead o f the short march portrayed by
Evans’s map, one hundred twenty miles o f harsh wilderness, laced with swamps, rivers,
lofty mountains, and impenetrable forests lay between the army and the French fort (fig. 6).
St. Clair, responsible for constructing the road, complained bitterly. “It is certain that the
ground is not easy to be reconnoitered for one may go twenty Miles without seeing before
him ten yards . . . The Roads are either Rocky, or full of Boggs, we are obliged to blow the
Rocks and lay Bridges every Day.” The pioneer companies slaved away under his
direction, cutting a twelve-foot-wide road to accommodate the wagons and artillery. They
hewed through ancient forests, blasted rocks, smoothed grades, and bridged rivers,
creeping along at a snail’s pace. At the end o f some days, the tail o f the four-mile-long
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column barely reached where its head had been that morning. By the evening o f June 17,
the army encamped only twenty-four miles beyond Fort Cumberland.82
After receiving reports of French reinforcements moving toward the Ohio, and
frustrated by the plodding pace o f his army, Braddock split his forces on June 8 and moved
ahead with a “flying column.” He chose a cross section o f the army, but in the words of a
British soldier, “his Dependence was chiefly upon us Regulars that he brought from

Ireland.” Selecting eight hundred regulars (excluding those raised in the colonies), four
hundred provincials, the road crew, and the bulk o f his artillery, the general pushed
forward. Braddock left Colonel Dunbar behind with the worst troops, weakest animals,
and most baggage to follow the advanced column as best he could.83
Despite Braddock’s intent, the “flying column” moved like a sick cow and its pace
increased only marginally. Regardless o f the general’s desire for speed, the artillery and
wagons still required a passable road to be cut. Washington expressed his frustration in a
letter home, complaining that “instead o f pushing on with vigor, without regarding a Little
rough Road, they were halting to Level every Mole Hill, and to erect Bridges over every
brook; by which means we were 4 Days gettg 12 Miles.”84
Though slow, Braddock conducted his movement in a manner to please the strictest
Prussian general, and the army maintained tight security. The infantry marched along each
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side o f the wagons and guns. Each company pushed thirty men out as flankers, and these
flanking parties pushed ten men out even further, effectively surrounding the column in
three layers o f soldiers. A vanguard o f three hundred soldiers led the way and protected
the road crew, and a rear guard followed to gather stragglers and discourage desertion (fig.
7). The grenadier companies occupied hills or ridges that dominated the line o f march, and
flankers scrambled through every thicket that might hide an Indian.85 At all halts, the
soldiers faced outwards with bayonets fixed, and at least half remained ready for action. At
night, the column closed up and slept in a formation similar to the march order. Pickets
walked their posts around the perimeter, a reaction force stood at the ready, and an
occasional patrol swept the dark woods.86
As Braddock’s army crawled closer to Fort Duquesne, signs o f the enemy
increased, and enemy scouts grew bolder. On June 24 and 26, British outriders discovered
recently abandoned camps where French and Indian scouts had left their mark. “They had
stripped and parted some trees,” wrote Captain Robert Orme, Braddock’s senior aide,
“upon which they and the French had written all Kinds of scurrilous language,” mostly
boasting o f their intended actions. Other lurking Indians sniped at the column, “ fireing at
our Wagoners fetching in their horses,” or, very rarely, shot and scalped an unwary
straggler.87
The British regulars grew nervous at the prospect o f encountering an unknown
enemy. Out o f spite and in a show o f bravado, the colonial soldiers stoked this fear by
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predicting that “if they attempted to fight Indians in a regular manner, they would certainly
be defeated.” Soon the regulars were “terrified at the notion of having no Quarter and
being scalped,” and o f the “Barbaras Usage which we knew they would treat us.” Tense
sentries at night fired at anything and nothing. Unprovoked shootings reached such a
magnitude that Braddock threatened punishment for future violators. The anxiety
exploded on July 6 during an Indian raid on the column, when wary provincials mistook the
army’s own Indians for hostiles and killed Scarouady’s son.88
Nerves aside, Braddock continued to move with absolute precision, taking all
necessary precautions to protect the army. On July 8, the column entered the narrow valley
o f Long Run, a likely ambush site. Braddock carefully posted troops along the ridges
ringing the valley and set Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Gage to the far end of the valley with
the grenadier companies. They found no sign o f the enemy. Further on, the scouts
reported, the army’s current path would cross a difficult ford and wind through the
Narrows, a very dangerous passage. This route would require an inordinate amount of
work to make the road passable and was a natural ambush site. Braddock opted to cross
to the west side of the Monongahela River, bypass the Narrows, and recross the river
upstream from Fort Duquesne. That night, the army bivouacked within two miles o f the
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Monongahela River. Braddock planned to cross the river early the next morning, camp on
the far side, and invest the fort on July 10.89
A scant ten miles away, the French commander, Captain Claude Pecaudy, sieur de
Contrecoeur, heatedly argued with his reluctant Indian allies and prepared to meet the
British onslaught. Less than two weeks before, in late June, Contrecoeur commanded
under two hundred Frenchmen, Canadians, and Indians. Lacking sufficient forces to
successfully defeat the British, he had planned to destroy the fort and retreat before the
British arrived. He sent numerous scouting parties to harass the British, but they
succeeded in killing only a few stragglers. The main body o f the enemy army was too alert,
impressing Contrecoeur with its tight security. They were “constantly on guard, always in
a line o f battle,” he reported, “so that all o f the efforts of the detachments were to no
avail.”90
On July 6, Captain Daniel Beaujeu arrived at Fort Duquesne with several hundred
French and Canadian soldiers. Just days before, over eight hundred Indians, mostly from
the upper Great Lakes, arrived with the metis Charles Langlade at their head. Beaujeu
knew the Indians would be useless in a siege, and he urged Contrecoeur to adopt a more
aggressive strategy. Contrecoeur finally decided to strike the English while on the march,
but his steadfast Indian allies hesitated to attack because o f inflated reports o f Braddock’s
strength. “Father, you want to die and sacrifice us. The English are more than four
thousand . . . Certainly you must see that you are making no sense.” Beaujeu, an
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experienced Indian negotiator, chastised the Indians for their fears, however justified. “I
am determined to confront the enemy. What—would you let your father go alone? I am
certain to defeat them!” Stung by the rebuke, the Indians agreed to go.91
James Smith, a young Pennsylvanian, watched the frantic preparation from within
Fort Duquesne. Six weeks before, a group o f Delaware Indians had captured him in
western Pennsylvania. Severely beaten while running the gauntlet, Smith was recuperating
in the French hospital in Duquesne in the tense days before the battle. He worriedly
watched as the Indians scooped up handfuls o f powder, shot, and flints from open casks.
Curious, he spoke to a friendly Delaware who understood English. The Indian indicated
that “Braddock’s army was advancing in very close order, and that the Indians would
surround them, take trees, and (as he expressed it) shoot um down all one pigeon.” At
mid-morning on July 9, 72 French regulars, 146 Canadians, and 637 Indians streamed out
the gates and ran south, intent on ambushing the British as they crossed the
Monongahela.92
By the time the French forces left Duquesne, Braddock’s army was fording the
Monongahela eight miles away. Braddock was no fool. He knew that the river was the
ideal place for ambush and therefore sent Gage and his strong vanguard to secure the far
banks. Gage crossed the river unopposed and unlimbered two cannon to cover the ford.
Braddock formed the remainder o f his army into a line o f battle for the crossing, still
expecting trouble. With great pomp and ceremony, the army crossed “over the river in the
91 Kopperman, Braddock, 22-29; Parkman, Montcalm and Wolfe, 123; “Relation Depuis le Depart des
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greatest order, with their bayonets fixed, colors flying, and Drums and Fifes beating and
playing, as He supposed the Enemy would take a view o f them in their crossing.93
Once on the far side of the river, the army resumed its march. The scouts under
George Croghan and a few horsemen led the way, followed by engineer Harry Gordon,
who marked trees for the road crew to fell. Gage’s vanguard o f 450 men, with its own
advanced and flank parties, trailed close behind. St. Clair’s road crew o f 250 men and
several tool wagons stretched for two hundred yards behind Gage. After a short break
tramped the main body, led by the sailors and the general’s guard. Five hundred men, in
twelve companies, marched along side the quarter-mile-long string o f wagons and artillery.
Sir Peter Halket and 120 soldiers, mostly Americans, brought up the rear. Hundreds o f
cattle and packhorses filled the gap between the flank parties and the main body (fig. 8).94
A feeling o f euphoria washed over the entire mile-long column. The French had not
attacked them at any likely place along their journey. Surely they would not do so now,
many thought. Several officers expected the French to abandon Fort Duquesne and flee,
and they anxiously awaited the sound o f the fort exploding in the distance. “Every one . . .
hugg’d themselves with joy at our Good Luck in having surmounted our greatest
Difficultys,” wrote Harry Gordon, “and too hastily Concluded the Enemy w ou’d dare to
Oppose us.” “There Never was an Army in the World in more spirits then we where,”
exclaimed Captain Robert Cholmley’s batman, “thinking of Reaching Fort de Cain the day
following.” Confident in success, Gage sent his two cannon to the rear and exclaimed loud
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enough for his soldiers to hear, “I do not think we Shall have much Occation for them.”
Without a thought o f danger, he marched by a large hill on his right, making no effort to
reconnoiter or hold it as he had the day before.95
At one o’clock, the light-hearted British and the disorganized stream o f French and
Indians collided one mile beyond the ford. The American scouts spied the enemy first, and
one “immediately discharged his piece . . . [and] cried, the Indiens was upon us.” Harry
Gordon stopped blazing trees, rode forward and saw over three hundred Indians and a
smattering o f Frenchmen in native garb running toward him. Captain Beaujeu, stripped to
the waist and sporting a gorget around his neck, led the boiling mass of warriors. Spying
the British grenadiers in their tall miter caps, he waved his hat left and right, signaling his
forces to split and run down the flanks o f the British column. The grenadiers responded as
trained soldiers should. Under Gage’s direction, they formed a line, fixed bayonets, and
delivered a series o f steady volleys that startled the French, caused several Canadians to
flee, and killed Beaujeu.96
Captain Jean Dumas, Beaujeu’s second, took control, and his forces began pouring
a devastating fire into the massed ranks of Gage’s men. The Indians shot down several
British officers immediately, followed by a steady flow o f regulars, and drove in the flank
parties. “The Men dropped like Leaves in Autumn, and all was Confusion,” wrote a
British officer in the front ranks. The formation disintegrated quickly and fell back onto St.
Clair’s working party. Within the first fifteen minutes o f the battle, the vanguard and the
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road crew were hopelessly intermingled and taking heavy losses. The Indians and French
arrayed themselves in a half-moon around most o f the column and perched on the hill that
Gage had ignored a short time before.97
With the first shots, Braddock reacted according to regulation. After halting the
column, he sent an aide forward for news, but the aide never returned. In spite o f his
ignorance o f the situation, Braddock ordered Lieutenant Colonel Ralph Burton to move
forward with four hundred soldiers to reinforce Gage. Separated by the wagons, the
companies marched forward and formed in front o f the baggage. The fire from the hilltop
immediately took its toll on the scarlet ranks. Burton shifted direction and formed his men
to assault the hill.98
While Burton formed, the tangled parties further up the line fell back again and
smashed into his moving companies. The result was pandemonium. Companies and
battalions became intermingled, men lost their places in formation, and officers lost their
units. “Such was the confusion, that the men were sometimes 20 or 30 deep,” facing in all
directions. The French and Indians were nearly invisible, presenting no targets for the
British to shoot at. “If any got a shott at one the fire immediately ran through the whole
line though they saw nothing but trees.” Soldiers in the middle o f the massed body leveled
their muskets and fired into the backs o f their comrades.99
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The officers, frantically working to restore order, “advanced into the front, and
soon became the mark o f the Enemy, who scarce left one, that was not killed or wounded.”
Burton organized a company and again attempted to storm the heights. When the Indians
shot him down, his dismayed soldiers scampered back into the jumble on the road.
Braddock, conspicuous on his horse, galloped everywhere, begging, pleading, encouraging,
and threatening his men to form ranks and follow his lead. Though an obvious target for
enemy marksmen, he remained unscathed. Braddock’s mounts bore the brunt o f shots
directed at him, and four horses died under him in quick succession.100
Despite all efforts, the men refused to advance, afraid to leave the “safety” o f the
masses. “He thought himself securest who was in the Center.” Like automatons, the
soldiers were lost when out o f formation and lacking familiar leadership. A nearly invisible
enemy continued to pour fire into the column and kept up a fierce din that terrified the
men, including Lieutenant Matthew Leslie. “The yell o f the Indians is fresh on my ear, and
the terrific sound will haunt me until the hour o f my dissolution.” An occasional warrior
burst from the undergrowth to rip the bloody scalp from a slain soldier, but the redcoats
saw very few o f the enemy. The Forty-fourth’s chaplain later exclaimed that “ in all the
Time I never saw one, nor could I on Enquiry find any one who saw ten together.” Thus
men continued to load and fire, massacring a host o f trees.101
Early in the fight, some o f the colonial troops sought cover and temporarily kept
the Indians at bay. A Virginia company drove the Indians away from a strong point,
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momentarily throwing them into confusion. Captain Cholmley’s batman, who witnessed
their efforts, claimed that these “two hundred . . . American soldiers that fought behind
Trees . . . did the moast Execution o f Any.” Unfortunately, the Virginians were just as
invisible to the British as the Indians. Seeing only flashes and gun smoke, the redcoats
fired a devastating volley into the Virginian ranks, forcing them to return to the road.102
By four o ’clock, Braddock’s army was devestated. Over half o f the officers and
men lay dead or wounded, the remaining soldiers lacked ammunition, and the French were
attempting to bring a captured cannon into action. While mounting his fifth horse, the
charmed Braddock grunted as a bullet pierced his arm and lodged in his lungs. He
staggered, fell, and finally ordered a retreat.103
Washington accompanied Braddock as the retreat turned into a headlong race for
the river. The men “broke and run as Sheep persued by dogs,” the young man wrote.
Several officers, including the wounded Burton tried to rally the troops on the far side o f
the Monongahela. “It was with as much success as if we had attempted to have stop’d the
wild Bears o f the Mountain.” Most men kept running through the night and most o f the
next day until they reached Dunbar’s column over fifty miles away.104
At Dunbar’s camp, the army counted its losses. O f 1,459 soldiers and attendants in
the flying column, 914 were either dead or wounded, including 63 o f 86 officers.
Unknown to the British, the French butcher bill amounted to fewer than 70 casualties.
Over four hundred horses, one hundred cattle, a month’s supply of food and ammunition,
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several thousand pounds in currency, and a fine train of artillery lay scattered in the woods.
Most disturbing, other than the magnitude of human loss, was the capture o f Braddock’s
personal papers, including detailed plans for all four operations o f the 1755 campaign.105
Mortally wounded and in despair, Braddock ordered a retreat to Fort Cumberland.
With the majority o f his draft animals lost, he directed the destruction o f anything that
could not be carried. The general was in a state of disbelief, yet he had learned a valuable
lesson. In a moment o f clarity, he muttered, “We shall know better how to deal with them
another time.”106
On July 13, Braddock died. Fearing desecration o f his body by marauding Indians,
Washington ordered the general buried in the middle o f the road. As the survivors o f the
debacle march eastward, they tramped over his grave, obliterating all traces o f its
existence. Colonel Dunbar assumed command and marched the army into winter quarters
(in mid-summer) in Philadelphia, leaving the Virginia/Pennsylvania frontier at the mercy of
the enemy.107
Before Dunbar’s official dispatch could reach the various colonial governors,
rumors and eyewitness accounts swirled across the frontier. Teamsters fleeing on their
animals and swift-running soldiers reported a complete massacre. These stories changed
with each telling until the truth was lost. The general mood was one o f disbelief, expressed
so eloquently by the dying Braddock. “Who would have thought it?” And who would
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have? The most powerful British army in North America, fully supplied, heavily armed,
capably lead, and utterly crushed. People of all stripes sought a scapegoat. Politicians and
soldiers immediately hurled accusations and countercharges at one another. The British
officers blamed “that poor dumb ox, the British private soldier,” Americans criticized the
British, and the regulars, at the bottom o f the dung heap, blamed the Americans. The duke
o f Cumberland received harsh censure for devising the campaign, falling prey to the Ohio
Company and selecting the Virginia route, and for choosing Braddock. And, o f course,
everyone universally condemned the dead general.108
The debate over the causes o f Braddock’s defeat began in the months following the
battle and continues to rage today. Explanations and theories abound, many valid, but
many based on fictional or second-hand information. The varied criticisms fall into
traditional or modern interpretations.
The traditional American explanation held Braddock completely at fault, claiming
he was “too rigid, too narrow, too Prussianic.” Benjamin Franklin, and the nineteenthcentury historians Francis Parkman and Winthrop Sargent, typify this viewpoint. The first
o f their three major criticisms attacked Braddock’s apparent dependence on regular troops
and overconfidence in close-order tactics. “He had too much self-confidence, too high an
opinion o f the validity o f regular troops,” wrote Franklin, “and too mean a one o f both
Americans and Indians.” Braddock disdained the capabilities of Indians and irregular
forces and was completely ignorant o f them, the traditionalists claimed. When Franklin
reportedly warned the general o f Indian ferocity, he haughtily replied, “These savages may,
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indeed, be a formidable enemy to your raw American militia, but upon the King’s regulars
and disciplin’d troops, Sir, it is impossible they should make any impression.” 109
Braddock was certainly confident, but he was not ignorant o f irregular tactics and
forces. Although his one and only experience in combat ended in abject failure, Braddock
had most certainly learned o f such fighting through his comrades and popular and
professional literature. His career spanned a time period o f heightened interest in, use of,
and publication on irregular forces. While his personal library is a mystery, the sheer
volume o f material on the subject o f la petite guerre made his exposure to it almost
certain.110
But having knowledge o f such tactics did not make them an option for Braddock.
Bush fighting demanded initiative and discipline from the lowliest private, all performed in
an extended formation with little officer control. Teaching soldiers to fight in this manner
required considerably more time than training for close-order drill. Braddock’s troops,
new to each other and to the army and o f questionable quality, could barely march in
formation, and the general rightly dedicated the short time available to basic maneuver.
The soldiers panicked when under the close supervision o f officers. Their performance
unsupervised would certainly have been worse.111
The traditionalists’ second charge claimed that Braddock’s contemptuous treatment
o f Indians lost their support. Though not a charmer, Braddock always treated Indians with
respect. To do otherwise would violate the king’s orders, which clearly stated “You w ill. .
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. cultivate the best Harmony and Friendship possible . . . with the Chiefs of the Indian
Tribes.” As with all orders, Braddock took this seriously and held several conferences,
plying the Indians with gifts and honoring them with artillery salutes. He even took a
wagonload o f gifts with his flying column. His justifiable attempts at discipline at Fort
Cumberland may have lost him forty Indians, but the feuding of Governors Dinwiddie and
Glen, and William Johnson’s failure to gain Iroquois support cost Braddock hundreds.112
The final indictment leveled by American traditionalists claimed that Braddock
ignored the advice o f his subordinates. Specifically, he ignored advice to bring up
Dunbar’s column before attacking the fort, and he refused to allow the provincials to fight
Indian style. This charge was unfounded. Braddock held several councils o f war before
and during the march and actively sought the advice o f his juniors. He ignored both pieces
of advice for good reason. Dunbar’s column, with the weakest animals, lay sixty miles
away. At his pace, he would have arrived at the Monongahela in late July or early August,
nullifying the purpose o f the flying column. He also led the worst troops, intentionally left
behind by Braddock. If Braddock’s best troops panicked and failed, it is doubtful that
Dunbar’s dregs would have tipped the scale.113
The argument regarding bush fighting is largely a legend built around the figure of
Washington. Billy Brown, a ninety-three-year-old slave, recalled his participation in the
expedition in 1830. He described Washington on his knees in the midst o f battle, begging
Braddock for permission to lead the Virginians into the trees. Braddock supposedly
“cursed him, and said, T’ve a mind to run you through the body . . . we’ll sup to-day in
112 Elaine G. Breslaw, “A Dismal Tragedy: Drs. Alexander and John Hamilton Comment on Braddock’s
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Fort Du Quesne, or else in hell!” Dramatic, yes, but Washington never recounted this
anecdote, and Brown’s testimony is hardly credible. The officer he claimed to have served
did not exist. Brown also neatly inserted himself at General Wolfe’s side at his death at
Quebec in 1759. Perhaps the clouds o f age or the desire for notoriety blended fact and
fiction in his memory. Regardless, the provincials who sought the cover o f the trees were
not frontiersmen or even backwoods settlers. Most hailed from the tidewater o f Virginia
and Maryland and “turned out to be mostly plowboys and drifters, younger sons and recent
immigrants who had never spent a night in the woods.” Many o f these provincials were
veterans o f Washington’s fight at Fort Necessity, where instead o f scattering into a loose
formation in the woods, they retreated to a fortified stockade (a conventional response),
indicating a lack o f familiarity with or confusion over irregular warfare. The following year
spent at Fort Cumberland before Braddock’s expedition had done little to improve their
lack o f frontier savvy. Furthermore, for these men to take cover behind trees would only
have provided temporary shelter. The Indians did not shelter behind a single tree during a
fight, but continued to fire and move, constantly seeking new positions. The mobile
Indians could easily flank and shoot a stationary soldier. Only with accurate musket fire
could the British hope to drive off the Indians, and the casualty figures from the battle
clearly demonstrate the redcoats’ and provincials’ lack o f marksmanship. For Braddock’s
army to “go to tree” would only have postponed the defeat.114
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The traditional British view disregarded any elements proposed by the Americans
and focused instead on the soldiers. Unable or unwilling to sully the reputations o f the
vaunted officer corps (or trying to regain their reputations after the battle), this group o f
critics blamed the “rabble’s” cowardice and panic for the defeat, while claiming that every
officer behaved bravely. This view is correct to a degree. The men did panic and the
officers were brave, but the failures o f certain officers, far beyond the control o f simple
soldiers, led to the panic, not some innate inferiority on the soldiers’ part. The redcoats
stood up under punishing fire for over three hours, suffering horribly. This alone indicates
a measure o f bravery.115
The first interpretation o f Braddock’s defeat to depart from these traditional
theories came with Stanley Pargellis in 1936. Disregarding previous hypotheses, Pargellis
focused on Braddock’s tactics and blamed the defeat on “incompetent leadership, judged
not by modem standards, but by contemporary.” Pargellis leveled three charges at
Braddock: he used improper formations, he failed to react properly, and he failed to
occupy the hill on the right flank o f the column. The first charge, based on an inexact
sketch and a second-hand report, claimed that the wagon train split each infantry company,
leaving all o f the officers on one side and preventing the unit from acting collectively. In
his rush to judgement, Pargellis ignored the proper formations indicated on Captain Robert
Orme’s map. Furthermore, Braddock’s personal order on March 27 directed each
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“Company . . . to te ll. . . off in two divisions . . . and post the second Commissioned Offr
and nonCommssd Offrs,” meaning an officer and sergeant were always with their troops.116
Pargellis’s last two indictments were logical and correct. He based his evaluation
on A Treatise o f Military Discipline by Lieutenant Colonel Humphrey Bland, a veteran o f
many campaigns with the British army. Bland first published the Treatise in 1727, and it
grew so popular within military circles that it went through nine editions in Europe and
several in America. The British army adopted Bland’s book and incorporated it into its

1728 Regulations.117
Bland gave standard precautions for marching through wooded country while
expecting an attack. He recommended establishing a vanguard, rear guard, and “small
Parties, commanded by seijeants, marching on the Flanks o f the Battalion.” Braddock did
each o f these correctly. However, Bland directed the vanguard to reconnoiter “every Place
where any Number o f Men can be conceal’d, such as Woods, Copses, Ditches.” The
vanguard did this regularly until Gage ignored the critical hill after crossing the
Monongahela.118
When the vanguard encountered the enemy, Bland continued, its leader was to send
information back to the main body commander immediately. The commander, with no
knowledge o f the situation, would halt and wait for this report before deploying his men.
“It is impossible to say in what manner . . . [the commander] is to act when he meets with
the enemy, without knowing their numbers, quality, and disposition.” Braddock sent an
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aide forward at the first gun, but receiving no reply, he blindly ordered Burton’s
detachment forward. Thus, Braddock violated two important rules, earning himself
condemnation by the very book he subscribed to. “If he is surpriz’d by neglecting common
Methods used to prevent it, his Character is hardly Retrievable.”119
Robert Yaples, writing in 1968, agreed with Pargellis’s tactical analysis, but pushed
the blame further down the chain o f command. Two faults that Pargellis attributed to
Braddock involved the vanguard: failure to take the hill and failure to advise the
commander o f the situation. As the overall commander, Braddock was still responsible,
but Gage, as commander o f the vanguard, failed in his duties. Furthermore, the vanguard’s
purpose was to stand and absorb the first shock o f attack and allow the commander and the
main body time to deploy. Gage’s force disintegrated quickly and fell back, causing
immense confusion. Overall, Yaples argued, the British simply had bad luck. The
combination of a chance encounter, Gage’s ineptitude, and terrain favorable to the enemy
led to defeat.120
Paul Kopperman sought to end the debate in 1977 with the most comprehensive
examination o f the battle to date. After considering all factors, he concluded, like the
British traditionalists, that the soldiers’ panic caused defeat. Even though Braddock and
his officers made mistakes, they did not lead their men into an impossible situation,
Kopperman argued. Any attempt to react “required a sizable body o f men to succeed,”
and the soldiers failed to answer the call. “The weight o f the evidence places the onus on
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them.” The army could have survived intact, Kopperman claimed “if they had kept their
heads.” A disciplined counterattack, using the bayonet, would have won the day.121
Kopperman was correct that panic among the men contributed to the defeat, but a
quick bayonet charge would not have necessarily saved the British. The success o f a
bayonet charge depended on an undisciplined or unorganized enemy, easily swept aside by
the threat o f cold steel in the belly. Leroy Eid argued that Indian warriors were highly
disciplined and organized. Many tribes operated in large numbers and used complicated
formations and maneuvers for warfare and communal hunting long before extensive
European influence. In 1606, the Frenchman Marc Lescarbot accompanied over one
thousand Algonquin warriors on a campaign against the Iroquois. “They practice
maneuvers, appear on schedule, march on order, and approach the enemy in clearly defined
unity,” he noted in a letter. James Smith, the young Pennsylvania prisoner at Fort
Duquesne, witnessed similar actions during his lengthy captivity. “Indians were punctual in
obeying orders, they acted in concert, and they cheerfully and immediately carried out
direction.”122
The Indians’ typical formation was a half-moon or horseshoe, which allowed
maximum flexibility and coverage, yet prevented heavy casualties. Rather than strike an
enemy head on, the Indians moved from tree to tree, working around their opponents’
flanks until nearly surrounding them. Several o f Braddock’s soldiers, such as Harry
Gordon and Captain Cholmley’s batman, both accurately described the technique. “They
Divided themselves and Run along our right and Left flanks . . . and fell upon the flank
partys,” described Gordon. Cholmley’s batman seemed to understand the intent.
121 Kopperman, Braddock, 114-121.
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“Immediately they began to Ingage us in a half Moon and still Continued Surrounding us
more and more.”123
Once holding the enemy in this strangle hold, the Indians maintained “a kind of
Running fight, Skulking behind Trees and Bushes,” always in motion. In a method Eid
labeled “blackbirding,” the Indians advanced or gave up ground as the battle progressed.
Small groups o f warriors worked together, some moving while their companions fired. If
an enemy pressed hard, such as Kopperman’s suggested bayonet charge, the Indians simply
retreated until the assault was over, then advanced again. Francis Parkman saw the futility
o f such an attack. “To charge the Indians in their hiding-place would have been useless.
They would have eluded pursuit with the agility o f wildcats, and swarmed back, like angry
hornets, the moment that it ceased.”124
Each theory, whether traditional or modern, contains elements of the truth behind
the expedition’s tragic conclusion. Four primary reasons emerge by combining the valid
portions o f each argument. First, the several months’ delay allowed this chance encounter
to happen. The duke of Cumberland’s misguided selection of the Virginia route led to an
extremely slow advance and difficulty in obtaining supplies. The ineptitude and
disinterestedness o f the colonial governments and merchants delayed the gathering o f
supplies and transportation assets. If Braddock had marched when he intended (in April),
or even a few weeks before he did, he would have beaten Beaujeu, his reinforcements, and
the Great Lakes Indians to Fort Duquesne. Beaujeu was the instigator o f the attack, and it
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was he who motivated the Indians. Without his crucial leadership, Contrecoeur would
have destroyed his post and retreated.
The lack o f Indian support hurt Braddock severely. Lacking a sizable
reconnaissance force, Braddock marched almost blindly into the wilderness. His few scouts
could cover only a short distance in front of the column and often refused to venture
further. As noted before, the blame for this is widespread. Intercolonial rivalry, personal
vendettas, Indian politics, Braddock’s discipline, and French influence all assured the
British a paucity o f support.
Third, the absolute panic of the regulars prevented any decisive action on
Braddock’s part. Whether because o f colonial “ghost stories,” lack of unit cohesion and
training, or the quick destruction o f the leadership, the soldiers refused to respond to
direction. They clumped together in a massive red target, unwilling to aggressively attack
the invisible force tormenting them, yet strangely willing to stand in place and absorb the
horrific fire.
Finally, tactical errors by the British officers left the army vulnerable to defeat.
Braddock marched over one hundred miles from his last base without constructing an
intermediate base or magazine in between, forcing him to gamble everything on
successfully taking Fort Duquesne, or else risking a long retreat through hostile territory
following defeat. Gage’s momentary lapse o f judgment left a dominating hill unoccupied,
unlike previous days. His inability to hold his command together, his failure to inform
Braddock, and the general’s rush to the front, resulted in chaos. Until that unfortunate
moment, European tactics had proved applicable and remarkably successful in the
backcountry. While recovering from his wounds in the days following the battle, Harry
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Gordon lamented the simple errors o f July 9. “Had our March Been Executed in the same
manner on the 9th as it was on the 8th, I should have stood a fair Chance o f writing from
fort Du Quesne, instead o f Being in the hospital at Wills’s Creek.”125
Beyond the tactical causes o f Braddock’s defeat, the practical consequences
became immediately apparent. The French gained a temporary respite and remained in
possession o f Fort Duquesne until 1758. The capture o f Braddock’s papers was a
miraculous boon, allowing the French to make adjustments to counter the other thrusts o f
the British campaign. Furthermore, the papers allowed France to portray itself to the
European community as a victim o f British aggression. The Canadian governor believed
that the plans provided the “most authentic proof o f extensive plans, for long the principal
occupation o f the court of Great Britain, to surprise this colony and invade it at a time
when, on the faith o f the most respectable treaties o f peace, it should be safe from any
insult.” In a letter to his royal “cousin” o f Britain, Louis XV complained o f British
duplicity, offering peace with one hand while preparing for war with the other. “It is
scarce possible to conceive how these assurances can be reconciled with the orders for
hostilities given . . . to General Braddock.” Such actions constituted “a public insult to his
Majesty’s flag.” In a letter o f reply, the British ministry countered Louis’s claims with
counter-accusations o f its own. The Ohio Valley belonged to Britain, contended the
ministry, based on the Treaties o f Utrecht and Aix-la-Chapelle, both o f which called for the
realignment o f lands in America to “the same footing that they were, or ought to have
been, before the last war.” In fact, continued the British reply, France was the aggressor in
America. But Louis had drawn “a veil over all the hostilities committed on [his] part in
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America,” including an “invasion” o f Nova Scotia, harassment o f British subjects
(American traders and Anglo-aligned Indians) in the Ohio Valley, and the erection “with an
armed force, a chain o f forts on the lands” claimed by Virginia. “Worn out by the
continuance o f these violences,” King George “found himself obliged to provide for the
security and defense o f his subjects.” There was nothing irreconcilable between Britain’s
peace overtures and Braddock’s actions, the letter concluded. On the contrary, France’s
hostile actions justified the British “response.” “It can never be unlawful to repel an
aggressor.”126
The citizenry of Britain called for vengeance against their traditional enemy, who
had so brazenly violated the rules o f “civil” warfare by employing “savages” in an ambush.
Lieutenant Matthew Leslie, St. Clair’s assistant, expressed the common sentiment clearly in
a letter to a Philadelphia merchant. “We have lost gallant officers and generous friends, not
in battle, for that we could bear, but by murder, by savage butchery. The French dared not
openly meet us; our’s is the loss, theirs the disgrace.” Later in the war, Britain would not
hesitate to use Indians or their “dastardly” tactics in the same way. Rather than genuine
astonishment, Leslie’s diatribe indicated an attempt by Britain to label the supposedly
civilized French as “savages.” Thus, each side used the battle’s outcome as propaganda to
justify an end to the political cat-and-mouse game and openly declare war.127
Beyond the sparring in the political arena, Braddock’s defeat had other far-reaching
consequences. Soon the frontier would erupt as French and Indian raiders swooped down
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on the nearly undefended border settlements from Virginia to Pennsylvania. Political
haggling in the provincial governments would prevent a unified and efficient response on
the part o f the colonies. Settlers fled eastward in droves, while hysterical preachers
predicted the fiery end o f the colonies. In the midst o f this turmoil, American colonists
began to question their ties with Britain. The home country was unable to protect its own
troops from a “small” band of “savages,” let alone defend the entirety of the North
American colonies, and as doubts arose over Britain’s invincibility, the first vestiges of an
American identity began to emerge.

I ll

AFTERMATH OF DISASTER: THE RESPONSE TO BRADDOCK’S DEFEAT

This will be the most melancholy and calamitous Year that Virginia
has ever seen; and he is a stupid Creature indeed, that can flatter
himself with better Hopes.
Samuel Davies, 1755
On July 20, 1755, the broken, dispirited remnants of General Edward Braddock’s
army trudged through the palisades o f Fort Cumberland, Maryland. O f the nearly twentysix hundred soldiers and sailors who had marched from the fort in May to destroy Fort
Duquesne at the Forks o f the Ohio, over four hundred lay dead along the banks of the
Monongahela River or strewn along the army’s line o f retreat, including the general
himself. The remains o f the army under Colonel Thomas Dunbar were still formidable in
numbers, but they possessed little o f the snap that characterized their step only two months
before. Once-crisp scarlet uniforms were stained with sweat and dirt, and muskets were
caked with powder residue. Many soldiers had discarded weapons and equipment in
efforts to flee from real and imagined pursuers. The following morning, nearly four
hundred wounded soldiers limped into camp or rode in litters pulled by horses “so much
fatiegued that we dread their performance.” Braddock’s ill-fated expedition was over.128
Beyond the physical reduction o f Braddock’s army, the defeat on the Monongahela
sparked a wide range o f reactions among government officials, the clergy, minority
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elements o f society, and private citizens. While the various colonial governors hoped for a
quick counterattack by Colonel Dunbar, they soon reverted to internal means to cope with
the loss. Robert Dinwiddie o f Virginia enhanced his militia’s strength, bolstered frontier
defenses, and appealed to the mercy o f God, while Robert Morris o f Pennsylvania
squabbled with his assembly over procedural minutia and the rights o f the proprietor.
Clergymen such as Samuel Davies quickly took the defeat as a sign from God and
vigorously called for repentance and reform, while slaves and Catholics harbored hopes for
ultimate French victory. Finally, large numbers o f colonists began doubting the myth of
British invincibility and began thinking o f themselves as Americans rather than Englishmen.
The schism with Britain was still twenty years away, but the roots o f independence and
American identity began to build in the midst o f Britain’s greatest war for empire.
While Braddock’s defeat was a major setback for the British effort to retake the
Ohio Valley, final French victory was not a certainty. Colonel Dunbar remained at Fort
Cumberland with nearly 1,600 soldiers, who with a period o f rest and refitting could
counter any French thrust down Braddock’s road. One officer in the column claimed that
the army was “still the finest ever seen in America.” With four months o f good weather
remaining in the year, sizable reserves o f food and munitions, and great numerical
superiority over the French, a counterattack was possible. However, Dunbar harbored no
illusions o f grandeur or desire for notoriety, nor did he have any intention o f marching west
again or even o f remaining on the frontier. Rumors o f his impending departure spread
faster than official dispatches, causing consternation among the backcountry settlers.
Governor Morris o f Pennsylvania feared that Dunbar’s departure would not only leave the
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frontier undefended but also cause widespread panic and flight to the east. “The Removal
o f the Army from the Frontiers will leave the back Settlements entirely exposed to the
Incursions o f the French and Indians, who are flushed by their Late Victory, and will be
encouraged by the Retreat o f the Forces . . . The People being defenseless will immediately
quit their Habitation.” Besides a power vacuum in the West, Governor Dinwiddie o f
Virginia feared that French and Indian raiding parties would “come over the Mountains and
rob and murder our People.” Not a man to dwell on fear, Dinwiddie proposed immediate
action. Writing to Governor William Shirley, the new commander-in-chief o f British forces
following Braddock’s death, Dinwiddie urged Shirley to send Dunbar against Fort
Duquesne as quickly as possible in order “to retrieve our Loss.”129
But British commanders and politicians seemed more concerned with placing blame
for the defeat and punishing malefactors than repairing morale and attacking again. “Great
dishonour has been reflected on the British arm y” wrote Charles Chauncy, an influential
Congregational minister from Boston, and its leaders were “pleased to lay the blame on the

soldiers,; speaking o f them as cowards, and as leaving their officers to fall a sacrifice to the
enemy.” Sir Thomas Robinson, the British secretary of state, proposed harsh terms to
“rehabilitate” Dunbar’s men and urged the colonel to “make as many examples o f the most
notorious delinquents as shall be found requisite and expedient to restore the Discipline.”
He further threatened to cut off veteran’s benefits at Chelsea Hospital for any shirkers.
Dunbar unknowingly acted on this advice before receiving it and generously applied the
lash to his soldiers’ backs. Duncan Cameron, a veteran redcoat, claimed never to have
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seen worse punishments. “Here was Court-Martial, upon Court-Martial, and the most
cruel Whippings succeeded them as ever I beheld.”130
Shirley heeded the advice o f the various governors and ordered Dunbar to march
on Fort Duquesne with all dispatch. However, he allowed Dunbar to refrain from
attacking if “it shall become absolutely Impracticable.” Granted official sanction to retreat
and with his mind already made up, Dunbar quickly marched his army to Philadelphia.
Benjamin Franklin derided Dunbar for this overzealous charge to the rear. “He continued
his hasty march through all the country, not thinking himself safe till he arrived at
Philadelphia, where the inhabitants could protect him.”131
Dunbar’s decision was unfortunate for the British. Soon after the battle on the
Monongahela, the French withdrew a number o f troops from Fort Duquesne and sent them
to reinforce other threatened posts. The bulk of the Great Lakes Indians, the true victors
at the Monongahela, left shortly afterward as well. They had taken numerous scalps and
several prisoners and thus satisfied set off for their homes. Pierre Pecaudy, sieur de
Contrecour, the commander o f Fort Duquesne, admitted that if the British had returned
and attacked again, he would have been “seriously embarrassed.”132
The various tribes o f the Ohio soon made up for the departure o f the Great Lakes
Indians. Throughout Braddock’s campaign, the Ohio Indians had remained neutral, hoping
for the British to drive the French out o f their lands but unwilling to commit to either side.
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Braddock’s virtual annihilation left little doubt over which European power would triumph
and “gave the French [,] who remained Masters of all that part o f the Country, an
opportunity to strengthen and increase their Indian Interest and Influence . . . They won
over several o f these Indians, who were before in our Interest, and some who held
themselves . . . neutral.”133
Numerous raiding parties o f Indians and Frenchmen fell on the undefended farms
and isolated hamlets along the Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Virginia borderlands, burning
homes and either killing the inhabitants or carrying them into captivity. The killings
reached such magnitude that Captain Dumas at Fort Duquesne complained that for eight
days he could do nothing else but pay scalp bounties. The settlers along the frontier
seemed helpless before the onslaught o f raiders even though the war parties were relatively
small. Dinwiddie chastised Colonel David Stewart o f the Virginia militia for his county’s
apparent unwillingness to confront the raiders. “It appears to me that Your People sit
quiet under [attack] with’t rising in proper Bodies to defeat their Designs,” as if the people
were “siez’d with a Panick.”134
Devastating raids continued throughout the summer and fall of 1755. On October
16, Indians destroyed Mahanahy Creek in the Susquehanna River Valley, killing or
capturing twenty-five people. Two weeks later, half o f the population o f Great Cove,
Virginia died under the hatchet. Similar attacks devastated English settlements throughout
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the Shenandoah Valley, and war parties penetrated to within fifty miles o f Philadelphia,
twelve miles o f Winchester, Virginia, and sixty-five miles o f Boston. The overwhelmed
commander o f Fort Cumberland, Adam Stephen, wrote despondently to George
Washington. The raiders “go about and commit their outrages at all hours o f the day, and
nothing is to be seen or heard of, but desolation and murder heightened with all barbarous
circumstances, and unheard of instances o f cruelty . . . The smoke o f the burning
plantations darkens the day and hides the neighboring mountains from our site.”135
Facing imminent death, frontier settlers fled in droves to the relative safety o f the
East, leaving large areas o f western Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Virginia empty o f white
settlers. Governor Horatio Sharpe o f Maryland reported in September 1755 that “the
Country is entirely deserted for 30 Miles below Fort Cumberland.” Six weeks later, the
London Public Advertiser extended the abandoned zone to seventy-five miles. Finally,
Daniel Dulany of Maryland claimed that “all the plantations in this Province (except two or
three) for near one hundred miles to the Eastward o f Fort Cumberland have been
destroyed, or deserted.”136
Dinwiddie reported a similar exodus in Virginia, and flight reached such
proportions that Washington, as commander o f the Virginia regiment, published an
advertisement in Winchester in October urging settlers to remain in their homes. “I can
venture to assure them, that in a short time, the Frontier will be so well Guarded, that no
mischief can be done, either to them or their Plantations.” This did little to stem the tide,
135 Alberts, Adventures ofStoboy 150-51; Adam Stephen to Washington, Winchester, 4 October 1755,
Washington Papers, 2:72-73.
136 Horatio Sharpe to Dinwiddie, [Annapolis], 2 September 1755, Sharpe Correspondence, 1: 279; N.
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and Adam Stephen warned that “unless Relief is Sent to the Back inhabitants immediately
None will Stay on this Side Monocasy or Winchester.”137
Despite Washington’s assurances, Indian and French raids continued without
respite. With colonial forces posing no credible threat, raiding parties attacked to the very
gates o f Fort Cumberland, where two Indians captured a boy “within Musket Shot o f the
Sentry.” Another party accosted Stephen immediately outside the gates, and he “Savd
[his] Bacon by retreating to the Fort.” Stephen, like all military commanders on the
frontier, was plainly frustrated by his inability to defend himself, let alone his district. “It
Sits heavy upon me, to be obliged to let the Enemy pass under our Noses without even
putting them in bodily Fear. This increases Their Insolence, and adds to the Contemptible
\

Opinion The Indians have o f us.”138
The colonial governments did not sit idly as their constituents died. However, their
responses varied from quick funding and recruitment in Virginia to wholesale debate and
deadlock within the Pennsylvania assembly. New York and New England, with the bulk of
their troops and efforts focused on Crown Point, Fort Niagara, and Fort Beausejour, could
send little aid to their brethren to the south. Both the New York and New Jersey
assemblies increased funding and manpower levies in response to the Indian attacks, but
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they directed these resources toward the northern missions. Thus, Pennsylvania, Maryland,
and Virginia were left to deal with the frontier situation as best they could.139
After the initial shock o f defeat and period o f unity, the Pennsylvania government
quickly reverted to its cycle o f contention between the governor, representing the
proprietor’s interests, and the Quaker-dominated assembly. Governor Morris insisted that
the assembly take quick action to “prepare for our own Defense.” The assembly could
hardly disagree with the need to act, but how to respond was another matter entirely. The
assembly and the city council o f Philadelphia consistently answered the governor’s
proposals with polite refusal, while the governor staunchly protected his prerogative and
interests against incursions by the assembly. When Morris requested the city council to
provide quarters for Dunbar’s army, the mayor and aldermen refused. “We know of no
law that Authorizes us to make such provisions, and, therefore, have it not in our powers
to Obey your Order.” On another occasion, the governor requested funds for gifts to
cement alliances with the few Indian nations still friendly to the British. As expected, the
assembly refused. “As our Treasury is exhausted by the very heavy charges for the King’s
Service, these Indians are come among us at a very unfortunate time when it is not in our
power to supply them.” The assembly instead “suggested” that the proprietor, “whose
interest is at least as much concerned as ours,” assume the expense.140
The Philadelphia council’s refusal to quarter troops and the assembly’s convenient
“inability” to fund Indian gifts were both symptomatic of a much deeper schism between
the assembly and the governor. Each jealously guarded its powers and constantly sought
to limit those o f the opponent. While both the assembly and the governor allegedly had the

139 Shirley to Robinson, Shirley Correspondence, 2:219.
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people’s best interest in mind, the petty power feud between them overshadowed any
desire to act decisively or unite. Furthermore, the governor was intimately attached to the
proprietor, whose influence and near immunity from assembly actions angered many
Pennsylvanians. Such antagonism between key portions o f government was difficult to
overcome, even in the midst o f emergency. In fact, in a continuation o f the power
struggle, the Quakers in the assembly quickly blamed the governor for the Indian attacks.
Believing that their fair treatment of Indians had kept the peace for years, the Friends in the
legislature declared that non-Quaker violence and provocation had sparked the war.
Because they dominated the assembly, the Quakers assumed that the people would shift
blame for the war and government inaction from the assembly to the governor’s council.141
Beyond mere jealousy and rivalry, the assembly vehemently opposed the
proprietor’s immunity from tax bills passed by the colonial government. Soon after
Braddock’s defeat, the assembly passed a bill granting £50,000 for “the King’s use,” to be
raised in part by taxing all estates, real and personal, in the colony. Governor Morris
immediately claimed exemption for the proprietor and demanded another spending bill.
The assembly refused to change its stance, as did the governor. Exasperated, Morris
attempted to shame the assembly into conforming to his wishes. “Had you really any
tenderness for your bleeding country would you have acted the part you have done? . . . or
would you now . . . waste your time in disputing about new and extraordinary Claims of
your own raising when every head and hand should be employed for the public Safety.”142
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If Morris hoped to spur the assembly into action, he was sadly mistaken. Stung by
the governor’s claims o f indifference, the assembly hardened its stance and responded with
a lengthy and heated letter, outlining its objections to proprietary exemption. Discounting
any claims o f encumbrance on the proprietor’s estates, the assemblymen pointed to the
illogic o f forcing the people to pay for the proprietor’s defense while he contributed
nothing. Such a measure was “abhorrent to common Justice, common Reason, and
common Sense.” The legislators further accused the proprietor and governor of
attempting to subvert the rights o f Englishmen. “Our Lord Proprietary, though a subject
like ourselves, would send us out to fight for him while he keeps himself a Thousand
Leagues remote from Danger! Vassals fight at their Lord’s expense, but our Lord would
have us defend his Estate at our own Expence. This is not merely Vassalage . . . it is even
more slavish than Slavery itself.” This rhetoric rankled Morris so much that he effectively
wrote off any possibility o f compromise with the assembly. “My assembly meets to
morrow,” he complained to Shirley,” but by what I can learn nothing is to be expected
from them.” The unwillingness o f either side to bargain shocked even Governor
Dinwiddie. “I think the G’r sh’d have submitted in hav’g the Proprietor’s private Estate
subjected to the Taxes o f the other Subjects.”143
Governor Sharpe o f Maryland avoided Pennsylvania’s troubles by not bothering to
call his assembly at all. Sharpe distrusted the Maryland assembly, which was “fond o f
following such Precedents” set by Pennsylvania. Instead, the governor took action on his
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own and ordered several small forts, garrisoned by volunteers, to be built throughout “the
distant parts o f the province” to shelter outlying settlers.144
O f the three colonies immediately concerned by Braddock’s defeat, Virginia
responded with greatest heart. The ever-optimistic Dinwiddie initially discounted reports
o f the slaughter and hoped it was “not so bad as reported.” Even after confirmation o f the
loss, Dinwiddie remained upbeat. Dunbar was a good officer, he wrote Washington, and
he would surely counterattack and prevail. With Dunbar’s retreat to Philadelphia, the
governor shifted his hopes to the Virginia troops, whom he considered sending to the
Great Meadows o f Fort Necessity fame to build a fort and prevent further French
incursions.145
After his appointment as commander o f the Virginia Regiment, Washington
persuaded Dinwiddie to abandon plans for the Great Meadow (possibly out o f personal
aversion) and turn his efforts to more realistic ventures. Dinwiddie concurred and
authorized Washington to raise sixteen companies to form the Virginia Regiment,
disbanded after Washington’s defeat in 1754, and another six companies o f “rangers” 146 to
defend the frontier during the regiment’s generation. Like his Maryland counterpart,
Dinwiddie ordered the construction o f blockhouses throughout the backcountry to
encourage settlers to remain and defend their homes.147

144 Sharpe to Dinwiddie, [Annapolis], 23 August 1755; Sharpe to William and John Sharpe, [Annapolis],
11 August 1755, Sharpe Correspondence, 270-71, 267.
145 John Richard Alden, Robert Dinwiddie: Servant o f the Crown (Williamsburg: Colonial Williamsburg
Foundation, 1973), 55; Dinwiddie to Dobbs, Dinwiddie Correspondence, 2:181.
146 These men were not rangers in the style of Robert Rogers’ Rangers. The Virginia Rangers were not
skilled woodsmen or expert Indian fighters. They were often recruited from tidewater settlements and
many had never seen an Indian. These six companies of rangers were merely a stopgap solution until the
Virginia Regiment could assume the defense of the frontier.
147 Dinwiddie to Washington, Commission, 14 August 1755, Washington Papers, 2:3-4; Alden, Servant o f
the Crown, 60.

90

However, unlike Morris and Sharpe, Dinwiddie worked closely with his assembly
and successfully passed a number o f measures in August 1755 to counter the French and
Indians. During the first session o f the House o f Burgesses following Braddock’s defeat,
Dinwiddie followed New England precedent and presented a bill that provided a £10
bounty for every Indian scalp brought to a government agent. “I hope you will think the
Measures taken by our Brethren o f New-England, expedient to your Safety also; and by
giving a Reward for the taking or scalping o f Indian Enemies, provide such as
Encouragement as may induce our People to cut off the Destroyers, before they come to
execute their purposed Villanies.” While this did little to endear the Virginians to friendly
Indians, it gave the British colonists a personal stake in the war, even if it was purely
economical. Along with the scalp bounty, the burgesses amended the militia law to
authorize Washington’s recruiting for the Virginia regiment. In addition, to support the
new regiment, the assembly voted another £40,000 to be raised by a duty on imported
goods, a head tax on all tithable people, and a land tax.148
With solid support from his legislature and governor, Washington acted quickly in
his capacity as commander-in-chief o f the Virginia military to protect the Virginia frontier.
Admonishing his district commanders for remaining within their forts and leaving the
settlers to fend for themselves, he ordered them to “send out strong Parties to Scour the
Woods and Mountains.” He also vigorously pushed his recruiting officers to fill the ranks
o f his embryonic regiment.149
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Despite Washington’s best efforts, few volunteers signed up to fight. In a letter to
Washington, William Brickenbrough reported the difficulties encountered by his recruiting
officer. “He has Try’d Every place where there was the least liklyhood o f getting recruits
b u t . . . the People are deaf to reason . . . They are determin’d not to go till they are
forced.” Unfortunately, coercion became necessary, but such methods produced
undesirable results. Many Virginians violently resisted compulsory service and ended up in
jail, only to have mobs free them hours later.150
Washington’s experience with local militia units was little better. These part-time
soldiers frequently refused to assemble and leave their homes undefended. In October
1755, Washington called on a militia company to follow him in pursuit o f a raiding party,
“but was told by Colo. Martin who had attempted to raise the Militia for the same purpose
that it was impossible to get above 20 or 25 Men, They having absolutely refus’d to stir,
choosing as they say to die with their Wives and Family’s.”151
Although troubled daily by recalcitrant recruits and bullheaded militiamen,
Washington and Dinwiddie both recognized the need to enact changes in how they fought
the French and Indians. Having witnessed the futility o f massed volleys against a scattered
enemy, Washington ordered his commanders to train their men to fire at individual marks.
Dinwiddie, borrowing a page from Benjamin Church and King Philip’s War, recommended
using dogs to aid in tracking raiding parties. “I think some good Dogs w ’d soon find out
the skulking Places o f the Ind’s, so that the Rangers may come up with them.” Adam
Stephen requested “Shoe-packs or Moccosons” to outfit his Scouts to prevent “the Indians
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discovering] our Parties by the Tract o f their Shoes.” Finally, Dinwiddie and Washington
both saw the need to train soldiers in the methods o f woodland warfare. The governor
urged Washington to “teach [the soldiers] as much as possible Bush-fighting.” In
response, Washington called on his old acquaintance, Christopher Gist, to form a company
o f rangers consisting entirely o f woodsmen. Clearly Virginia was adapting to the Indian
threat.152
While actively preparing to fight external enemies, Dinwiddie and other colonial
leaders also sought to counter the enemy within. As in all times of extreme emergency,
citizens and government officials saw dissidents and undesirable elements o f society as
potential threats or potential scapegoats. Governor Dinwiddie was particularly concerned
about the vast number o f African slaves in Virginia. They required constant supervision,
especially after Braddock’s defeat. The slaves had been “very audacious in the Defeat on
the Ohio,” believing that the French would grant them freedom and land. As a result,
Dinwiddie had to leave soldiers in each county to “prevent these Creatures enter’g into
Combination]s and wicked Design ag’st the Subjects.” Governor Shirley feared this
would prevent the southern colonies from contributing much to the war effort. As it was,
troops desperately needed on the frontiers served on slave patrols instead.153
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Catholics attracted a great deal o f suspicion as well. Because Catholics were
“spiritual kindred” to the French, most colonists automatically suspected them o f treason.
The justices o f Berks County, Pennsylvania considered Romanists to be “the worst
Subjects and worst o f Neighbors.” Similar to the reaction o f the slaves, many Catholics
allegedly expressed “great Joy at the bad News lately come from the Army.” While certain
elements of the Catholic community may have enjoyed tweaking John Bull’s nose, they
gained nothing from the defeat. Indian tomahawks split a Catholic Englishman’s head no
less than that o f a Protestant. Still, Protestants entertained notions o f Catholics sneaking
away to Fort Duquesne to conspire with the French for the takeover o f the colonies, and
the Berks County justices demanded quick action to counter such imagined threats.
Maryland suffered from similar suspicions. “The clamors against Popery is as loud as
ever,” wrote Daniel Dulany, who witnessed the near lynching of a priest in Alexandria,
Virginia. The priest escaped execution only by bribing a boatman to row him across the
Potomac River to safety. “Something ought to be done in regard to these priests, but the
present heat and ferment o f the times are such that nothing short o f a total extermination o f
them . . . will be heard of.” Governor Sharpe ordered his local justices to inquire into “the
Reports o f the tumultuous Meetings and Cabaling o f Negroes, the Misbehaviour o f the
Roman Catholicks . . . and the absence o f . . . Priests,” but his deputies found nothing of
substance. In Philadelphia, anti-Catholic rhetoric turned into violent action. “The Mob
here upon this occasion were very unruly, assembling in great numbers, with an intention of
demolishing the Mass House belonging to the Roman Catholics, wherein they were
underhand excited and encouraged by some People o f Higher Rank. But the peaceable
Quakers . . . prevailed with the Mob to desist.” Governor Shirley looked beyond slaves
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and Catholics and imagined a universal insurrection o f all “undesirables.” “It is well
known, how much these Colonies abound with Roman Catholicks, Jacobites, Indented
Servants for long terms, and transported Convicts, who, far from being depended upon
against the enemy, would doubtless, many o f them instigate the Slaves to rebel, and
perhaps join with them.”154
This anti-Catholic, anti-Indian, anti-rabble rhetoric surfaced in religious sermons as
well. Religion gained heightened attention in the months after Braddock’s defeat as people
sought divine answers for the loss and guidance for the future that politicians and soldiers
could not provide. Parsons capitalized on the opportunity and turned their oratorical skills
and biblical themes to meet the twin goals o f spiritual conversion and public service in war.
While preachers may have used the terror o f Indian attack to reap a rich harvest o f souls,
they provided invaluable service as promoters o f military service and communal
preparedness. Behind their fiery and often hysterical rhetoric, preachers shared certain
characteristics in their messages and methods. All sought to determine the cause o f the
debacle on the Monongahela, which was invariably sin, and present the means to overcome
colony-wide guilt. Many strove to establish the justness and necessity o f the war with
secular treatises and scriptural prophecy. Finally, as guardians o f their people, preachers
inspired their audiences to greater levels of piety and martial preparedness to ensure
ultimate victory.155
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Thomas Barton had no single audience to administer to. As a traveling missionary
for the Church o f England, Barton preached to small and large crowds throughout York
and Cumberland counties in Pennsylvania. A short time after Braddock’s defeat, Barton
delivered an address entitled Unanimity and Public Spirit to an audience at Carlisle,
Pennsylvania. He used the opportunity to chastise the people—a thinly-veiled reference to
the assembly and the governor—for division, disunity, and selfishness. “We have been rent
and tom into so many Factions and Parties,” he cried, that the colonists faced the
destruction o f their faith and way o f life. Popish fiends hovered in the shadows, waiting to
strike down the “pure reformed Light o f the blessed Gospel” and replace it with “Legends
and Traditions . . . in an unknown Tongue.” He summoned memories o f the “bloody
Persecutions o f an unrelenting Mary” and the repression under the “bigotted James” to
remind his people what their fate would be under a Catholic sovereign. Braddock’s defeat
was a warning from God, Barton continued, and an opportunity for redemption. “Our
heavenly Father has thought fit to permit” the French and Indians to prevail so “that we
may thereby be led to Repentence before it be too late.” The fiery preacher concluded that
salvation and victory lay in the reunification o f Pennsylvania (specifically the government)
and concerted action. “Let us therefore lay aside every idle Division and Distinction, and
be heartily united for the future.”156
William Vinal’s message to Rhode Islanders was considerably harsher than
Burton’s to the Pennsylvanians. As with many war sermons, Vinal reverted to the Old
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Testament, compared the colonists to the ancient Hebrews, and invoked the powerful
image o f the angry and vengeful God o f Abraham. But instead o f criticizing the people for
secular disunity, Vinal accused them o f separating themselves from God through unending
sin, which he labeled “the Accursed Thing.” Success in war depended on God’s assistance,
he claimed, and a society must put its sins aside to gain God’s favor. God “cannot go forth
with our Army to fight our Battles for us . . . [if] the Accursed Thing [is] in the Midst o f
us.” But sin was rampant in the colonies, Vinal vehemently claimed, especially among
“Persons of Note, and by Men in Authority and Office, both Civil and Ecclesiastical.” He
attempted to identify the colonists’ foremost sin but found “so many Accursed Things
among us, that I have been almost at a Loss which to single out.” Finally, after haranguing
profaners, heretics, drunks, and women in “immodest clothing,” Vinal declared “self-

confidence in War” to be the vilest sin o f all.157
Such confidence by itself was not the cause o f Braddock’s destruction, but when
“added to all our other Flagrant Crimes, and public Sins, [it] seems to have f i l l ’s up our
Measure, and ripen'd us for the Melancholy Event.” Vinal reminded his audience o f the
universal hubris upon Braddock’s arrival in Virginia and his march to Fort Duquesne.
Success seemed guaranteed, and soldiers boasted of their prowess, “proudly declaring, that
they will have the Victory whether He will give it or not; And so by Consequence, setting
up themselves, not only against God, but above God.” But the sin o f confidence was not
Braddock’s alone, Vinal continued, but o f every citizen. “0 Braddock, thou wast slain in
our low Places.” Vinal railed at his audience, bitterly recounting New England’s fall from
grace. ‘"New-England. . . Thou wast once an Asylum o f persecuted Saints; but thou art
157 William Vinal, A Sermon on the Accursed Thing that Hinders Success and Victory in War, Occasioned
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now a Den o f Thieves and Robbers.” But to Vinal, even his audience o f “criminals” had
hope for salvation if they acted without pause. “TO ARMS, ye Descendents o f ancient

Heroes,” he cried to them. Vinal equally demanded that the colonial governments do their
allotted part and provide men and money to prosecute the war. And like Barton, he called
for “ Unanimity and a good Understanding among the English Governments in
America.”158
More influential than either Barton or Vinal, and possibly the most influential
preacher during the war, was Samuel Davies o f Hanover County, Virginia. A dissenting
preacher, who had led the Presbyterians of Virginia in their struggle for toleration, Davies
worked tirelessly throughout the Seven Years’ War to recruit soldiers and ready the
province for war. He possessed unlimited spirit and zeal, and his inflammatory style of
oratory captivated his audiences. Davies seemed “fired by equal parts backwater
circumstances and audience, New Light enthusiasm, and English Whig animadversions
against the French.” Following Braddock’s defeat, he wholeheartedly committed himself
to the war effort, and through a series o f war sermons he became one o f the most
successful recruiters in the colony. In his sermons, Davies connected secular and divine
goals; to be ready to face the French and Indians, he said, Virginia must be both spiritually
and materially prepared. To Davies, political survival of the colony was a direct correlative
o f the personal salvation o f its citizens. Therefore, secular service, usually in the form of
military service, became an “adjunct” of religious duty and an expression of religious faith.
Thus, as a soldier o f Christ, Davies contributed as much to the war effort as anyone who

by the Defeat o f the Hon. Edward Braddock.. . (Newport, RI: James Franklin, 1755), 1, 6, 10-12.
158 Ibid., 12, 14-15, 18,21.
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carried a musket. The men he “saved” would, he believed, express their newly-found (or
rediscovered) piety in public service.159
On August 5, 1755, Davies delivered Virginia's Danger and Remedy, which
Davies saw as “a hurried Attempt to save a sinking Land.” During these “two marathon
discourses” spanning the better part o f a day, he lamented the poor spiritual and physical
condition o f Virginia. A severe drought was causing crops to wither and die; trade was
stagnant; money was in short supply; and taxes were heavy. All o f these were signs o f
God’s displeasure and warnings for the people to repent and reform, said Davies. But
Virginians, enraptured by secular vices, continued to ignore God’s admonitions, forcing
Him to resort to the ultimate form o f coercion. Braddock’s defeat and the vicious Indian
raids, claimed Davies, were God’s final warning.160
Like Vinal, Davies rattled off a lengthy list o f sins committed by Virginians and
likewise focused on “People o f high Life and affluent Fortunes.” However, these daily sins
paled in comparison to Davies’s greatest accusation. He declared the masses to be atheists
despite what they might profess, and he accused them o f rejecting God as sovereign. Like
Vinal’s charges o f self-confidence, the Virginians’ rejection o f God as the ultimate power
had brought His wrath upon the people o f America. Davies took individual sin and applied
it to Virginia as a whole. The sins o f the multitude, he believed, transferred to the body
politic, rendering the colony fit only for destruction. Salvation o f the state hinged on

159 George William Pilcher, ed., The Reverend Samuel Davies Abroad: The Diary o f a Journey to England
and Scotland, 1753-55 (Urbana: Univ. of Illinois Press, 1967), x; Anderson, History o f the Church o f
England, 133; Marie L. Ahearn, The Rhetoric o f War: Training Day, the Militia, and the Military Sermon
(New York: Greenwood Press, 1989), 102-06; Larson, Prologue to Revolution, 1-2.
160 Ahearn, Rhetoric o f War, 102; Samuel Davies, Virginia’s Danger and Remedy: Two Discourses,
Occasioned by the Severe Drought in Sundry Parts o f the Country; and the Defeat o f General Braddock
(Williamsburg: 1756), iii, 6.
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repentance o f the individual, and until that occurred, God would continue to “give thee up
to thine Enemies, that though mayst feel and lament his Absence.” Like the Babylonians
sent by God to chastise the ancient Hebrews, the French and Indians would continue to
attack and triumph until God was satisfied.161
With great emotion, Davies called for his flock to act before God destroyed them
out o f anger. “REPENT! O my Countrymen, REPENT! REPENT! Down upon your
Knees before your injured Sovereign . . . Confess your Guilt, and implore Forgiveness.”
But while calling for spiritual conversion, Davies did not ignore the practical aspects of
war. Dismissing the militia as “a mere Farce,” Davies called on the people and leaders o f
Virginia to gather arms and ammunition, reinforce defenses, and join the army. “Put

yourselves in a Posture o f D e fe n s e Although he demanded surrender to God, Davies
seemed to be preaching “God helps those who help themselves.”162
Davies’s war sermons had a powerful influence both on his audiences and those
who never heard him preach. Governor Dinwiddie caught the spirit o f repentance, or at
least he recognized the need for public action in this regard. In late September, possibly
moved by Davies, the governor called for a day of fasting and repentance. “National
Repentance is the only Remedy for national Guilt.” Davies’s influence on audiences was
even more striking. John Rice recorded the impressions o f several “aged friends” who had
heard Davies speak. The emotional response o f the audience highlights Davies’s profound
ability to excite people into action. “As the preacher poured forth the stream o f his
eloquence, his own spirit was transfused into his hearers: the cheek that was blanched with

161 Ibid., 26-27.
162 Davies, Virginia’s Danger, 29, 11, 44.
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fear reddened, and the drooping eye kindled with martial fire, and at the conclusion, every
voice was ready to say~‘Let us march against the enemy—let us conquer or die!’”163
Who were the enemies that Davies’s audience rushed to combat? In reality, the
foes were French troops, Canadian militiamen, and a wide range of Indian tribes. But there
was a clear if uncoordinated effort on the part o f clerics, government officials, and private
citizens to portray the enemy in anything but human terms. While preachers tended to
produce the most virulent rhetoric, they held no monopoly on hatred. Just as New
Englanders had feared losing their “civilized” status and becoming “savage” in King
Philip’s War, the colonists o f the 1750s were determined to remove any shred o f humanity
from their enemy. Common references for French or Indians in sermons, legislation, and
letters included “Barbarians,” “Merciless Savages,” or the occasional “lawless Sons of

Violence and Plunder.” Governor Sharpe even described the invasion o f the raiders as an
“infestation,” as if their enemies were a swarm o f vermin.164
A popular method among preachers for dehumanizing the enemy was to portray the
French and Indians as “agents o f hell, as demons of Satan on the side of malignant, evil
powers.” Davies accused Indians o f “swilling” in their victims’ blood, thus investing the
Indians with satanic, vampire-like powers. “They are not Men\ they are not Beasts-of-

Prey, they are something worse; they must be infernal Furies in human Shape.”165

163 Virginia Gazette, 19 September 1755; William Henry Foote, Sketches o f Virginia: Historical and
Biographical, 1st Series (Richmond: John Knox Press, 1966), 295.
164 Lepore, The Name o f War, Davies, Religion and Patriotism: The Constituents o f a Good Soldier
(Philadelphia: James Chattin, 1755), 3-4; Barton, Unanimity and Public Spirit, 4; Sharpe to Shirley,
[Annapolis], 29 August 1755, Sharpe Correspondence, 273.
165 Larson, Prologue to Revolution, 34-35; Davies, Religion and Patriotism, 5; Davies, Virginia's Danger,
5.

By equating the French and Indians with Satan and stripping them o f their
humanity, Davies and others turned the war into a struggle between good and evil, a holy
war against the lawless sons o f perdition. Such infernal enemies, with an unquenchable
thirst for blood and violence, deserved only horrible violence in return. Governor
Dinwiddie used such reasoning to justify his request for the scalp bounty. The “brutal
Savages” who perpetrated “the most cruel Outrages” surrendered any right for mercy and
had thereby “subjected themselves to be considered, rather as devouring Beasts o f Prey,
then hostile Men.” A holy war against the forces o f darkness appealed to some colonists
and preyed on the fears o f others, encouraging and provoking many to either enlist and
fight or actively maintain the struggle at home.166
The rhetoric o f war did not disparage the French and Indians alone. Braddock’s
defeat and William Johnson’s “victory” at Lake George with an army o f provincials led to
widespread questioning o f British invincibility and superiority as well as a growing sense
among the colonists o f being American161 Years later, Benjamin Franklin noted this early
crack in imperial relations. “This whole Transaction gave us Americans the first suspicion
that our exalted ideas of the prowess o f British regular troops had not been well founded.”
Johnson’s triumph, with only colonial troops and Indians, over French regulars under the
illustrious Baron Dieskau seemed to confirm suspicions. Charles Chauncy proposed that
“the best British regulars could not have dispensed matters . . . with greater wisdom.” In

166 Mcllwain, Journals o f the House o f Burgesses, 298.
167 On September 8, 1755, a British force of provincial troops and Indians led by Sir William Johnson
defeated a French and Indian force led by Baron de Dieskau, a famous veteran of numerous European
wars, on the shores of Lake George, New York. After repulsing several attacks by French regulars, the
colonial and Indian forces swept the French from the field and captured Dieskau. Although Johnson was
heavily criticized for abandoning his drive on Crown Point, his victoiy, in light of Braddock’s crushing
defeat, earned him a baronetcy and a pension.

102

fact, he thought regulars o f little use except to “defend a fort, or to support Indian forces
against regular troops.” British officers and soldiers, he continued, were so haughty and
proud that they would rather stand in the open and die than “practise such a low kind o f
military art” as that o f the Indians.168
Chauncy, like many Americans, was convinced that American troops and officers
were necessary to guarantee success for any British military ventures in North America.
“It is now made m anifest. . . that neither British officer, nor private soldiers, without

American assistance, can be depended on for success against American enemies.” He
attributed the loss on the Monongahela to the British officers, who “had no Idea o f the

Manner o f fighting in use here.” Future commanders-in-chief would undoubtedly, and out
o f necessity, act “with the advise o f some thoroughly experienced Americans actually
present with him.”169
Chauncy obviously wrote with Johnson and Washington in mind as the
“experienced Americans.” After Fort Necessity and Braddock’s expedition, Washington’s
reputation for wilderness expertise spread with astonishing speed. Although both battles
led to defeat, reports o f Washington’s and the Virginians’ aptitude for irregular warfare
created an image o f wildemess-sawy fighters compared to “the stiff and stupid redcoat.”
In fact, Seth Pomeroy o f the Massachusetts provincials declared Washington to be the true
hero o f the Monongahela. “The salvation o f [Braddock’s] whole army from destruction
was made, under God, by a young American officer named George Washington.” This
image was not entirely realistic. Historian Armstrong Starkey discounts the validity o f

168 Franklin, Autobiography, 225; [Chauncy], Letter to a Friend, 3; J. Mitchell, The Contest in America
between Great Britain and France (London: 1757), 137-38.
169 [Chauncy], Letter to a Friend, 7-8.
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such proclamations by examining Washington’s tactics in 1754 and later during the war
with Britain. “This was the same Washington who had been surrounded and trapped at
Great Meadows the preceding year and who, during the American War o f Independence,
rejected calls for guerilla war and created an army o f which Bland would have been
proud.” While Washington’s initial attack on French forces in 1754 was an ambush, his
reaction was entirely conventional: retreat to a fort and offer battle in an open field.170
Not all o f Washington’s contemporaries shared the belief in American superiority or
contempt for the redcoats either. One American lamented the lack o f wildemess-sawy
frontiersmen in the colonies, declaring his fellow subjects “nothing but a set o f farmers and
planters, used only to the axe or hoe,” not bom with Pennsylvania rifles in hand or hatchets
at their hips. Daniel Dulany hoped that Braddock’s defeat would not “induce the ministry
into the mistake that regulars are o f no great use in our woods.” In fact, nothing could be
“more detrimental to America” than to remove the regulars.171
Regardless o f the truth or fiction of British inferiority and American preeminence,
what was truly important was the American people’s perception o f Braddock’s loss, and
large numbers o f Americans believed the rhetoric that bombarded them. A letter in the
Boston Public Advertiser, openly challenging the notion of the superiority o f British
regulars, represented widespread feelings. “[Braddock’s defeat] is, and always will be the
Consequence o f Old England Officers and Soldiers being sent to America; they have
neither Skill nor Courage for this Method o f Fighting, for the Indians will kill them as fast

170 Leach, Arms for Empire, 407n; Seth Pomeroy, The Journals and Papers o f Seth Pomeroy: Sometime
General in the Colonial Service, ed. Louis Effingham DeForest (New York: Society of Colonial Wars,
1926), 133; Starkey, European and Native American Warfare, 96; General Humphrey Bland was the
author of A Treatise on Military Discipline, which became the semi-official drill book for the British army.
171 Mitchell, Contest in America, 72; Dulaney, “Military and Political Affairs,” 31.
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as pigeons.” Furthermore, the author expressed the growing belief in the superiority o f
American soldiers. “300 New England Men would have routed this Party o f Indians.”
Finally, it advocated quasi-independence. “We want nothing but Money and Liberty to act
. . and w e’ll soon have all North America.” The legends surrounding George
Washington’s conduct in battle further enhanced this stance, contributed to 1775’s rage

militaire, and lent credence to the legend o f “the omnipresent American marksman clothed
not in a military uniform but in a hunting shirt.” 172
Finally, the defeat and subsequent deluge o f criticism and accusations even
managed to put a chink in the armor of the British military establishment. Although the
British military had long been exposed to or participated in irregular warfare in Ireland and
on the European continent or read accounts o f it in the American colonies, they suddenly
realized that they faced a new kind of petite guerre, different from the partisan warfare o f
Europe. Military leaders, heeding Braddock’s sage remarks, “Another time we shall know
better how to deal with them,” recognized the need for units and soldiers that could learn
to compete successfully with the French and Indians and defeat them through superior
proficiency in their own methods. The Virginian Adam Stephen neatly captured this need
for change. “It ought to be laid down as a Maxim to attack them [Indians] first, to fight
them in their own way, and go against them light and naked, as they come against us . . .
You might as well send a Cow in pursuit o f a Hare as an English Soldier . . . after
Canadeans . . . or Naked Indians.” Still rightly enamored o f the capabilities o f continental
tactics, key British army officers sought to combine the qualities o f scouts with the
discipline o f the line, resulting in the British light infantry. This adaptation to conditions, or

172 Davis, “Newspaper Accounts,” 319-320; Breslaw, “A Dismal Tragedy,” 27.
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“Americanization” o f the British army, provided the flexibility necessary to compete in
American warfare. The crucial campaigns still to come in the war, centered on the capture
o f large fortifications in the midst o f inhospitable terrain, would justify their decision.173

173 Leach, Arms for Empire, 369; Kopperman, Braddock, 226-27.

CONCLUSION

Edward Braddock’s defeat in 1755 is relegated to marginalia in many history books
today. Compared to the slaughter of General Abercrombie’s redcoats at Fort Ticonderoga
in 1758 or James Wolfe’s victory on the Plains o f Abraham a year later, the fight on the
banks of the Monongahela was small-scale. Indeed the consequences of defeat, while
immediately devastating to the soldiers who fought in it and the settlers who felt the wrath
o f Indian raiders, merely postponed British victory for a few years.
Beyond the short-term strategic implications, the battle forced the British to
reanalyze their methods o f fighting. Although the British had been long-exposed to
irregular warfare in Europe and by proxy in North America, this initial encounter of
regulars with Indians forced the British to rethink war in America, just as their experiences
in Scotland, Ireland, and on the European continent had done in the centuries before. Like
any culture faced with something new or novel, they were forced to analyze their own
methods, evaluate new techniques, and integrate them into their own culture. British
leaders, such as Henry Bouquet, Robert Rogers, and Lord Loudoun would make
adjustments just as Lord Mountjoy had done in Ireland two hundred years before. This did
not invalidate their methods o f warfare as some historians propose. Instead, the shift
indicated a degree o f flexibility developed through centuries of trial and error. The changes
after the Braddock debacle represented only one more such adjustment.
106
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The lessons learned from Braddock’s defeat were not lost during the American
Revolutionary War either, where both the British and the American rebels used
backcountry raiders and tactics. John Butler’s dreaded Tory rangers waged a brutal war in
the New England and mid-Atlantic borderlands, as did rebel George Rogers Clark in the
Illinois country. In a campaign eerily reminiscent of Braddock’s march on Fort Duquesne,
General John Stark led a conventional force of Continentals on a devastating march
through Iroquoia and returned virtually untouched. In the larger history o f warfare in
America, Braddock’s defeat may have been insignificant, but the ripples it produced
created change far beyond its scale.
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Figure 1. A highly idealized sketch o f a European set-piece battle (Battle o f Culloden,
April 15, 1745) From James Johnstone, A Memoir o f the ‘Forty-Five, ed. Brian Rawson
(London: Folio Society, 1958), 124, facing.

Figure 2. Champlain’s Fight with the Mohawks. From Colin G. Calloway, The Western
Abenakis o f Vermont 1600-1800: War, Migration, and the Survival o f an Indian People
(Norman: Univ. of OklahomaPress, 1990), 60.
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Figure 3. Irish Kerne, ca. 1540-1550. From David Beers Quinn, The
Elizabethans and the Irish (Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press, 1966), Plate 3.

Figure 4. Successful return of an English force after the defeat of the
Irish kerne, from Derricke’s Image o f Ireland, 1581. Note the severed
heads and prisoners on halters or being beaten. Thomas Bartlett and
Keith Jeffery, ed. A Military History o f Ireland (Cambridge: Cambridge
Univ. Press, 1996), 119.
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FIGURE 5. French, Indian and English Borderlands 1756-64
From Lewis Butler, The Royal Americans. vol. 1 of The Annals o f the K ing’s Royal Rifle Corps
(London: Smith. Elder, and Co., 1913), 194 facing page.
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Figure 6. Operations Against Fort Duquesne, 1755, 1758
From Douglas Edward Leach, Arms fo r Empire: A Military History o f the British Colonies in North
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FIGURE 7. Captain Robert Orme’s Sketch o f March Plan for General Braddock’s Column
From Winthrop Sargent, The History o f an Expedition against Fort Du Quesne, in 1755, Pennsylvania
Historical Society, Memoirs, 5 (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott and Co., 1856), 336.
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FIGURE 6. Disposition o f Braddock’s Army, 1:00 PM 9 July 1755
From Winthrop Sargent, The History o f an Expedition against Fort Du Quesne, in 1755, Pennsylvania
Historical Society, Memoirs, 5 (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott and Co., 1856), 218.
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